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A GREEN BOARD AS A CLIMATE-CHANGE IMPERATIVE:
APPOINTING A CLIMATE-CHANGE EXPERT
TO THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
Porcher L. Taylor, III
Harris L. Kay*
I. Introduction
In a nation still struggling to arrive at a post-recession relief destina-
tion, the American corporate board faces a formidable array of strate-
gic decision-making and risk-management challenges.' These
challenges run the gamut from executive pay reduction, to account-
ing reform. Paradoxically, with respect to climate change, accelera-
tion,' scandal and scientific vindication,' growing public skepticism,'
* Porcher L. Taylor, III, J.D., University of Florida College of Law; B.S.
United States Military Academy, West Point. Mr. Taylor is professor of
paralegal studies in the School of Continuing Studies at the University of
Richmond. He holds a joint appointment (2010-2014) as an associate
professor of management in the Robins School of Business at the
university. He developed and taught the national security law course in the
university's School of Law as an adjunct assistant professor of law. Harris L.
Kay, Esq., J.D., University of Richmond; B.A., College of William & Mary.
Mr. Kay is a partner with the Chicago-based law firm of Henderson &
Lyman, a boutique law firm that represents financial institutions and other
institutional clients in a variety of matters. He also serves on the board of
directors of a privately-held company. We are indebted to Doug Boyle,
Esq., for his invaluable assistance in the research and drafting of the
business judgment rule section of this article. Also, we appreciate Dr. David
E. Kitchen's assistance in shedding more light on the science of climate
change.
1. The board is "at the apex" of the decision-making process in public corpo-
rations, as "every major operational or strategic decision, including a com-
pany's policy toward the natural environment, must flow through the
board." See George Kassinis & Nikos Vafeas, Corporate Boards and Outside
Stakeholders as Determinants ofEnvironmental Litigation, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
399, 400 (2002).
2. With respect to global warming's acceleration forecast, climate change re-
searchers from the United Nations Environment Program recently pre-
dicted that the earth "will warm by 6.3 degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the
century even if the world's leaders fulfill their most ambitious climate
pledges." Juliet Eilperin, New Analysis Brings Dire Forecast of 6.3-Degree Tem-
perature Increase, WASH. PosT, Sept. 25, 2009, at A4, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/24/AR2009092402
602.html?hpid=topnews.
3. Nobel Prize co-laureate Al Gore best acknowledges and summarizes most of
the errors that have plagued the climate-change academy this past year: "It
is true that the climate panel [UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change] published a flawed overestimate of the melting rate of debris-cov-
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corporate defections and resignations,5 a new, controversial Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA") finding and rule,' a surprise inter-
pretive disclosure guidance from the Security Exchange Commission
("SEC");' legislative "gridlock" in the U.S. Senate,' a U.S. president
ered glaciers in the Himalayas, and used information about the Nether-
lands provided to it by the government, which was later found to be partly
inaccurate. In addition, e-mail messages stolen from the University of East
Anglia in Britain showed that scientists besieged by an onslaught of hostile,
make-work demands from climate skeptics may not have adequately fol-
lowed the requirements of the British freedom of information law." Al
Gore, Op.-Ed., We Can't Wish Away Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2010, at 11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/opinion/
28gore.html. "According to some critics, the UN climate change chief re-
signed partially from the pressures surrounding this series of errors." See
Neil MacFarquhar & John M. Broder, U.N. Climate Chief Quits, Deepening
Sense of Disarray, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at A8. Vindication for the Nobel
Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") in-
cluded new reports from the National Academy of Sciences that offered
cogent evidence that it would be "folly to put off dealing with" the climate
change problem any longer. See Editorial, Are They Paying Attention?, N.Y.
TIMES, May, 24, 2010, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
05/24/opinion/24mon3.html. On the corporate scandal front, NASA's
chief scientist reportedly made a "serious" recommendation to Congress:
send corporate executives to jail for sowing doubt about global warming.
See, Charles H. Moellenberg, Jr. & Leon F. Dejulius, Jr., Remove the Tort Lia-
bility Muzzle, NAT'L. L.J., May 10, 2010, at 34.
4. As a consequence of recent scandals, the climate-change academy is now
facing a "crisis of public confidence," with "serious damage" already in-
flicted, as manifested in the results of a poll conducted by Yale University
and George Mason University. John M. Broder, Scientists Take Steps to Defend
Climate Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, at All, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/03/science/earth/03climate.html. "The num-
ber of Americans who believed that climate change was a hoax or scientific
conspiracy had more than doubled since 2008 . . . ." Id. In Britain there
has been a major increase in climate-change doubters. See Elisabeth Rosen-
thal, Climate Fears Turn to Doubt Among Britons, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2010, at
A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/science/earth/25cli-
mate.html. One business and public policy scholar, Robert Hahn, notes
that climate change "deserves to be debated thoughtfully in the academy
and by decision makers." Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating Fact from
Fantasy, 33 HARv. ENvrTL. L. REv. 557, 591 (2009).
5. Prominent member corporations of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have
resigned their membership in response to the Chamber's bellicose stance
on new climate-change legislation. See infra note 27 and accompanying
text. Three large companies-British Petroleum ("BP"), ConocoPhillips,
and Caterpillar-all quit the U.S. Climate Action Partnership, a powerful
lobbying group that had focused on shaping climate-change legislation. See
Stephen Power & Ben Casselman, Defections Shake Up Climate Coalition, WALL
Sr. J., Feb. 17, 2010, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBO
001424052748704804204575069440096420212.html.
6. See infra Part V.D.
7. See infra Part V.E.
8. Since the U.S. House of Representatives passed a promising climate bill in
the summer of 2009, there has been a legislation roadblock in the Senate.
See Juliet Eilperan & David A. Fahrenhold, Lawmakers Move to Restrain EPA
on Climate Change, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2010, at A2, available at http://www.
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straddling the climate-change fence,' and a failed Copenhagen Sum-
mit."o Boards must sort through this disarray for a clear-eyed carbon
strategy.
The current global financial crisis could precipitate some dramatic
changes in corporate governance. Cogently, it is during the apex of a
crisis "when the pain is felt most that there is an opportunity to break
established malpractices and governance structures, to implement
new laws and regulations, and to find support for economic and finan-
cial reforms."" The prevailing view of many experts is that companies
and boards must realize that courts might apply higher standards of
responsibility to them for risk management during these trying finan-
cial times.1"
To successfully confront some of these demands, it may require a
fundamental change in board composition, including, but not limited
to, more expert directors. Consider as Exhibit A the Federal Reserve's
"unprecedented federal intervention in pay decisions traditionally left
to boards and shareholders," as the Federal Reserve assertively imple-
ments compensation regulations for lenders."" This will make life
"more difficult for boards and their compensation committees, al-
ready under fire for controversial pay practices." 4 As a result of this
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/04/AR2010030404
715.html.
9. Environmental advocates have grumbled that President Obama has "all but
abandoned his quest for sweeping climate change legislation and begun to
reach out to Republicans to enact less ambitious clean energy measures."
SeeJohn M. Broder, Environmentalists Cooling on Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2010, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/science/
earth/18enviros.html.
10. Lamentably, the Copenhagen Summit failed to achieve its coveted goal: a
legally binding treaty requiring nations to reduce their greenhouse gases.
See Copenhagen Climate Conference, YOUNG PEOPLE'S TRUST FOR THE ENVIRON-
MENT, http://www.ypte.org.uk/environmental/copenhagen-climate-confer-
ence/87 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010); see also Kelley Inman, Recent
Development: The Symbolic Copenhagen Accord Falls Short of Goals, 17 U. BALT. J.
ENVTL. L. 219 (2010).
11. Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1069
(2009) (citation omitted).
12. Perry E. Wallace, Symposium: Climate Change, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate
Law Duties, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 757, 762 (2009).
13. Aaron Lucchetti, et al., Fed Hits Banks with Sweeping Pay Limits, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 23, 2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12562302
6446601619.html. In June, 2010, the Federal Reserve adopted "sweeping
new rules that will give banking regulators more clout over how the na-
tion's thousands of banks compensate employees ranging from senior exec-
utives to traders." Deborah Solomon, Tighter Scrutiny for Bank Salaries, WALL
ST. J., June 22, 2010, at A4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10
001424052748704895204575320802814329546.html. "Top government of-
ficials ... have identified flawed compensation practices as a contributor to
the financial crisis." Id.
14. Joann S. Lublin, Boards Face Expanded Responsibilities, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21,
2009, at A2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12533148152922
4335.html#mod=todays-us-page-one.
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government interloping in the business judgment of bank compensa-
tion committees, banks might need to makeover their compensation
committees by recruiting and seeking directors who are compensation
experts.
The recession-generated need for the federal government to peri-
odically place itself in the corporate board room could presage an
overhaul in corporate governance at all publicly-traded U.S. compa-
nies," not just in terms of pay. Indeed, once shareholders and gov-
ernment policy makers have a voice in executive salary, what could be
next on the intervention horizon?1 7
On this slippery slope, could the next government inquiry be "how
big a carbon footprint does the company leave?" Strikingly, years
before the financial crisis, prudent climate-change or greenhouse-gas
("GHG") emission management18 should have been at least a blip on
the radar screens in the boardrooms of practically every corporation.
Climate-change "certainty" combined with the "emerging market and
regulatory cultures" surrounding climate change augur that "'virtually
every company's activities, business models and strategies will need to
be completely rethought,' given the cross-industry ubiquity of cli-
mate change's touch. Since corporations have "past and continuing
roles in creating the problem" of global warming,2 0 and even compa-
15. Id. One executive-pay expert asserts that some bank board's lack directors
who are executive-pay experts. Id. Even the SEC recently entered the inter-
loping fray by promulgating new rules that, inter alia, require public compa-
nies to disclose more information about how their boards are structured,
the expertise of directors, and how they pay employees, all in the aftermath
of the Bernie Madoff mega-fraud and the recognition that "ineffective over-
sight by corporate boards fueled the financial crisis." Zachary A. Goldfarb,
SEC Tightens Rules on Investment Advisers, Corporate Transparency, WASH. POST,
Dec. 17, 2009, at A30, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/16/AR2009121604148.html.
16. Federal government intervention in corporate pay scale decision-making
might ultimately extend well beyond bailed out Wall Street banks, bailed
out auto-makers like General Motors, and Federal Reserve regulated banks,
to all publicly held companies. Devin Leonard, Executive Pay: A Special Re-
port: Bargains in the Boardroom?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at BU1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/04/business/04comp.html. Indeed,
pay czar Kenneth Feinberg, an Obama appointee, has noted that his
"blueprint" for compensation limitations could be applied "in myriad other
boardrooms." Id.
17. See Karen Dillon, The Coming Battle Over Executive Pay, HARY. BUS. REv., Sept.
2009, at 94, 97.
18. A top scholar in climate-change law and corporate law, Professor Perry Wal-
lace, warns that "[GHG] management now ranks among the world's great
challenges." Wallace supra note 12, at 757. He persuasively makes the case
that there is a "rapidly growing movement toward corporate strategic plan-
ning for GHG management," and that this momentum is likely to
strengthen in the future. Id. at 758, 776.
19. Id. at 757-58, 758 n.3 (quoting Rory Sullivan, CORPORATE RESPONSES TO CLI-
MATE CHANGE 2, 3 (RORY SULLIVAN ED., 2008).
20. Id. at 757.
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nies that have not contributed to climate change can have their bot-
tom lines impacted, undisclosed and unmanaged climate-change risk
might detrimentally impact companies and shareholders, placing
both companies and boards at potential liability risk.
This Article makes the innovative and timely case for a climate-
change imperative: a green board. Urgency is evident, with the arrival
of "a fast-emerging new burden on board members to oversee their
company's posture on climate change and to begin monitoring an
area that, until now, has drawn scant attention in the boardroom.""
One major impetus for the proposal advocated in this Article is that
there is apparently a dearth of green boards in corporate America.22
In contrast, European and Canadian companies appear to be at the
vanguard of utilizing green boards.2 3
The foregoing translates as follows: "boards must begin now to de-
velop the governance expertise to provide the companies with an un-
derstanding of the issues and priorities" associated with climate
change. 24 As a result, practically every corporation needs to adopt
21. Jeffrey M. Cunningham & Aaron Bernstein, Governance Required: New Regu-
lations and Rising Temperatures Have Put Corporate Boardrooms on Notice, 33
DIRECTORSHIP 44, 44 (2007).
22. A recent benchmarking study by three corporate governance researchers of
how twenty-five Fortune 500 companies in five different industries ad-
dressed corporate citizenship through their governance, structures, and sys-
tems found "few boards have a sub-committee dedicated to sustainability or
corporate social responsibility per se." Guy Morgan, et al., Leading Corporate
Citizenship: Governance, Structure, Systems, 9 CORP. CITIZENSHIP 39, 43-44
(2009).
23. In a 2007 benchmarking study of how 125 large European companies man-
aged their GHG emissions, 76% of those firms had a high-level environ-
mental or climate change strategy group involving board and senior
management personnel and 70% had a named board member with respon-
sibility for this area. See Rory Sullivan, CORPORATE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: ACHIEVING EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS THROUGH REGULATION, SELF-
REGULATION AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (Rory Sullivan ed., 2008), at 11-12.
On the Canadian side of the Atlantic, a 2006 Carbon Disclosure Project
("CDP") survey of 280 Canadian companies published by the Conference
Board of Canada revealed that 65% of companies surveyed had elevated
climate change to the board level by granting directors responsibility for
"climate-change strategic risks." Stephen Bernhut, Corporate Climate Change,
CAMAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 2009, at 23, 26, available at http://www.camagazine.
com/archives/print-edition/2009/january-february/features/camagazine
5372.aspx.
24. See Cunningham & Bernstein, supra note 21, at 44. Jeff Smith, head of the
environmental practice group at Cravath, Swaine & Moore and co-author
of the path-breaking American Bar Association book on U.S. climate-
change law, wisely warns that, in the context of potential director personal
liability, "[w]e are at a point of inflection where board behavior needs to
change and adapt." Id. To be sure, director expert advice is vital on mat-
ters of environmental responsibility and the risks of litigation. See Kassinis
& Vafeas, supra note 1, at 401.
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board expertise as a new best corporate governance practice,2 5 to in-
clude the recruitment and appointment of a climate change or GHG
management expert as an independent director to serve at the
board's center of gravity: the audit committee. Compellingly, the
value of director expertise in general27 is supported by a large corpus
of empirical research, and this Article catches the decade-long renais-
sance that advocates and favors that trend in the boardroom.
To fully appreciate the critical need for board expertise in environ-
mental matters, one need not look any further than the Gulf Coast,
where putative gross negligence by petroleum giant BP unleashed the
biggest oil spill disaster in American history.28 Sadly, BP's board chair-
man has no experience in the oil industry29 and none of BP's other
fourteen board fiduciaries has deep-water drilling operations exper-
tise."o In fact, recently fired BP CEO and board member Tony Hay-
25. The Delaware Supreme Court has made a very relevant statement about
best practices in Brehm v. Eisner; "Aspirational ideals of good governance
practices for boards of directors that go beyond the minimal legal require-
ments of the corporation law are highly desirable, often tend to benefit
stockholders, sometimes reduce litigation and can usually help directors
avoid liability. But they are not required by the corporation law and do not
define standards of liability." 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000), quoted in In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 n. 399 (Del. Ch. 2005).
26. Some researchers, noting the unique role of the audit committee, make
this exhortation to all boards: "It's time for [the audit] committee to assert
its unique role as messenger to the rest of the board of directors on all
matters of risk management and financial-reporting judgments and to bol-
ster trust among corporate constituencies-especially shareholders." H.
David Sherman, Dennis Carey, & Robert Brust, The Audit Committee's New
Agenda, HARv. Bus. REv.,June 2009, at 99, available at http://www.kornferry
institute.com/files/pdfl/HBR The Audit CmtteNew_Agenda.pdf. Cor-
porate board audit committees' most likely face more regulation-imposed
practices and liability perils than the entire board combined. RALPH D.
WARD, THE NEW BOARDROOM LEADERS: How TODAY'S CORPORATE BOARDS
ARE TAKING CHARGE 162 (Praeger, 2008).
27. In the 1990s, when globalization was rapidly making international expertise
a business necessity, there was a big hunt for global outside directors, espe-
cially from the Asian Pacific area. See Theodore Jadick, Recruiting Global
Directors, CORPORATE BOARD, Jan./Feb. 1996, at 11.
28. Bradley Blackburn & Matt Gutman, BP Oil Spill Called Worst in U.S. History,
as MMS Official Steps Down, ABCNEWS, May 27, 2010, http://absnews.go.
com/WN/Media/bp-oil-leak-now-worst-history-surpassing-exxon/story?id=
10759905 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
29. Julia Werdigier, BP Chairman's Low Profile Likely to Grow, N.Y. TIMES,Jun. 16,
2010, at A20.
30. See The Board, BP.com, http://www.bp.com/managedlistingsection.do?cate-
goryld=9021801&contentld=7040608 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) (a review
of the biographies of BP's directors on its corporate website reveals their
expertise is void). A primary task of BP's board's Safety, Ethics and Envi-
ronmental Assurance Committee is to "[m]onitor and obtain assurance
that the management or mitigation of significant BP risks of a non-financial
nature is appropriately addressed. . ." See BP P.L.C., BOARD GOVERNANCE
PRINCIPLES 12 (n.d.), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp-in-
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ward defiantly testified to Congress that he was not an expert at all.'
Consequently, this Article predicts that Congress might ultimately pass
legislation that requires the entire deep-water drilling industry to have
at least one board member who is an environmental expert.
This Article foresees five potential concomitant advantages that
might emerge from having a climate-change expert in the boardroom
nerve center: fostering climate-change literacy among board mem-
bers, providing more prudent GHG risk-detection and management,
helping shield directors from personal liability in shareholder deriva-
tive lawsuits under the higher-standard business judgment rule that
courts are expected to adopt on GHG decision-making, reducing Di-
rector and Officer ("D&O") liability insurance premiums, 2 and trig-
gering higher corporate governance ratings for firms that adopt this
practice.33
Part II starts with an overview of optimal board composition and
how it is particularly a sine qua non for company survival in these ardu-
ous times. Then, this Article introduces the value that director exper-
tise generally adds to decision-making for boards, and then segues to
intriguing research that shows that accounting expertise is valuable in
enhancing board audit committee effectiveness. The Sarbanes-Oxley
ternet/globalbp/STAGING/globalassets/downloads/B/bpboardgov-
ernance-principles.pdf.
31. David J. Lynch, Leaders Take Shots at BP but Leave Empty-Handed: Chief Execu-
tive Apologizes but Offers Nothing New at Hearing, USA TODAY, June 18, 2010, at
2B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/money/20100618/
bpceol8 cv.art.htm?loc=Interstitialskip.
32. This Article proposes that D&O insurers require boards to appoint a cli-
mate-change director to the audit committee and reward that practice with
a reduced insurance premium. Cognizant that "climate change presents a
gigantic challenge to them in terms of anticipating (and pricing for) risks
associated with global warming, rising oceans, and changing climatological
patterns," insurance companies are positioning themselves to make dra-
matic changes in the way they conduct business. Jayne W. Barnard, Corpo-
rate Boards and the New Environmentalism, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. POL'Y
REV. 291, 309-10 (2007). Indeed, witness the fact that "[s]ome insurance
companies have implied that they may even withdraw [D&O] liability cover-
age from those companies that do not have adequate risk management pol-
icies developed for climate change." Christina Ross, et al., Limiting Liability
in the Greenhouse: Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the Context of Global
Climate Change, 26 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 251, 270 (2007).
33. One criterion of corporate governance rating agencies is board structure,
"such as independence of the board and key committees." Thuy-Nga T. Vo,
Rating Management Behavior and Ethics: A Proposal to Upgrade the Corporate Gov-
ernance Rating Criteria, 34 IowA J. CoRP. L. 1, 7 (2008). By illustration,
these influential agencies "assign strong ratings to companies that separate
their board chair and chief executive positions." Id. at 13. Since these rat-
ing agencies "exert strong influence over the governance practices of pub-
lic companies," corporations "pay close attention" to their individual
governance ratings. Id. at 1, 7 (2008).
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Act's ("SOX")3 4 encouragement of director expertise on audit com-
mittees in 2002 and the subsequent surge over the years in account-
ants serving on such committees will be the center of gravity of this
subsection. Using SOX as an expertise analogue, we also explore the
need for and value of climate-change expertise on the board, espe-
cially to offset any potential board groupthink on climate change.
Part III examines best practices of leading companies in carbon re-
duction, top green boards, and how to best recruit a climate-change
director. Part IV briefly evaluates the continuing evolution of the
venerable but confusing business judgment rule, which is designed to
shield boards from personal liability for good faith, conflict-free deci-
sions. Part V probes how the Supreme Court, Congress, EPA, and
SEC have all recently converged to impact how corporate boards
should respond to climate change.
Lastly, Part VI delivers a sobering caveat to boards by creatively rais-
ing what could ultimately be a new business judgment challenge: the
declaration by the U.S. intelligence community that climate change
poses a 'threat multiplier' effect to national and global security," and
the possibility that courts could take judicial notice of this declaration.
Director expertise on climate change would prove vital in this new
arena.
II. Director Expertise: Adding Value to Decision-making
A. A Stark Lesson from the Global Economic Crisis: Board Composition
Failure
In his new book, Ram Charan, a leading corporate governance
scholar and advisor, astutely captures the urgency of the board com-
position revolution that the global economic crisis has abruptly
wrought upon corporate America:
The role of the board has unmistakably transitioned from
passive governance to active leadership with a delicate bal-
ance of avoiding micromanaging. It's leadership as a group,
not leadership by an appointed person. This group needs the
right composition to succeed, and that composition will have to
change, sometimes abruptly, as conditions do. With the right
composition, a board can create value; with the wronF or inap-
propriate composition, it can easily destroy value.
34. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified
in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
35. Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109
CoLUM. L. Riv. 1531, 1576 (2009). Professors Freeman and Guzman cite a
host of authorities for this sobering security assessment including, Congres-
sional testimony by the intelligence community, several reports by think-
tanks, and law review articles. Id. at 1576 n.199.
36. RAm CILRAN, OwNING UP: THE 14 QUESTIONS EVERY BOARD MEMBER NEEDS
To ASK 1 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., ed., 2009) (emphasis added).
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Further advancing this board composition reform theme, Charan
cites a telltale job posting at Citigroup:
In April 2008, Citigroup added an extraordinary job posting
to its website, seeking individuals with "a particular emphasis
on expertise in finance and investments." What made the
post so unusual were the positions Citigroup was trying to
fill: directors. It took $18 billion in write-downs in the fourth
quarter of 2007 and capital infusions of over $20 billion for
the largest bank in the world to realize its board lacked fi-
nance and investment know-how."
To be sure, the posting serves as a wakeup call for corporate
America that Citigroup was not an isolated case of one board having a
deficit in "crucial expertise," because a legion of boards in the finan-
cial services industry fell short on this requisite." This urgent expec-
tation that boards can help their companies "find a safe place to
land"" in the economic crisis is not limited to just ailing financial
services firms. Even "good companies" with AAA debt ratings have
been caught in the crisis tidal wave.40 There is a universal lesson here
for all boards: directors must have the "specific skills and perspectives"
necessary to carry out their duties.4 1
Boards should not be lulled into myopically thinking that Wall
Street financial greed is the sole key catalyst that can plunge the world
into economic downturns. Ominously, "[c]limate change could trig-
ger similar global slowdowns in the future."" This revelation should
make the following coverage of strategic problem-solving, risk man-
agement, and the remaining parts of this Article even more germane
for those companies that recognize the true value of striving toward a
green board.
B. Expertise and Strategic Problem-Solving
Lamentably, "the financial crisis of 2008 laid bare a long buried
truth: that many boards do not really own the strategy of their com-
pany." 4 3 It has become clear that boards are failing to maintain a
"clear, credible strategy with appropriate risk levels." 44 However,
problems in the macroeconomic milieu exposed intrinsic risks in
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. JACK KROL, Foreword to CHARAN, supra note 36, at vii. Krol is the former
chairman and CEO of DuPont. Id. at viii.
40. Id. at vii.
41. CHARAN, supra note 36, at 2. Even "hardworking, conscientious boards can
fail when their directors lack critical expertise." Id. at 16.
42. Freeman & Guzman, supra note 35, at 1575.
43. CHARAN, supra note 36, at 57.
44. Id. Charan cites Motorola, Yahoo!, Sears, and the Detroit automakers as
illustrations of this picture. Id.
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many company strategies that blindsided the boards. 45 A brand new
look at strategy is mandated in the midst of the ongoing transfigura-
tion of the business environment.46 The age of keeping "strategy at
arm's length" is over. 47 A brief but helpful look at some of the strate-
gic problem-solving literature in the context of director expertise is in
order.
One dimension of corporate strategy-making is certainly axiomatic
and cautionary, irrespective of the level of "'vigilance." Boards with
directors lacking relevant experience are most likely not capable of
"fully contributing" to corporate strategy.4 8 Fortunately, even in the
face of incomplete information about a particular board issue, most
outside directors, by virtue of their principal occupation, have ac-
quired strategic problem-solving skills which enable them to partici-
pate in strategy making. 49 In order to assist in strategy-making, such
directors "process available information more efficiently and by rea-
son of analogy."" Indeed, these expert directors provide insightful
input into the cognitive tasks through which strategic decision-making
is carried out: scanning, interpretation, and choice.
This Article first turns to risk management and the board's pivotal
role in serving as the company's devil's advocate.
1. Expertise and Risk Management
The most important role for the board in the context of risk man-
agement52 "is to act as a devil's advocate . . . by questioning assump-
45. Id.
46. Id. Charan observes that a strategy-engaged board is the most helpful tool a
CEO can have because directors "can open management's eyes to blind
spots, raise the imagination to make bold moves, or advise management to
pull in its horns when the risks are too high." Id. at 58.
47. CHARAN, supra note 36, at 58.
48. Mark Kroll, et al., Board Vigilance, Director Expertise, and Corporate Outcomes,
29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J., 363, 364.
49. Violina P. Rindova, What Corporate Boards Have to Do with Strategy: A Cognitive
Perspective, 36 J. MGMT. STUD. 953, 961-62 (1992). Compelling statistics
about board composition support this proposition, indicating that outside
directors have significant strategic expertise in the problem-solving arena.
Id. at 962.
50. Id. at 961.
51. Id. at 954.
52. For purposes of this Article, we use Fanto's general definition of risk man-
agement: "the practice of assessing and identifying the different kinds of
risks facing a person, an institution, or society because of its activities and
environment, determining the likelihood of losses and other consequences
from those risks, and taking appropriate actions, which include monitoring
the risks and reducing the losses and other consequences from them."
James Fanto, Symposium: Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk
Management in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
731, 731 (2009).
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tions of the risk managers" and imagining adverse scenarios.""
Expert directors would enhance this inquisitorial, worst-case brain-
storming role, because they "intuitively know how to ask the right
questions."'"' A board must realize and implement the firm's risk
model basics, have a risk committee, develop risk-crisis procedures,
and assure that the organization's risk taking is linked to executive
compensation."
Risks are subject to under and over estimation. Where does climate
change fall on this risk spectrum? Ironically, the current financial cri-
sis and climate change have much in common on the risk front. First,
both share some common antecedents: while corporations and execu-
tives bear much of the blame, ordinary "Americans' over-consump-
tion, heedlessness, and greed contributed to the financial meltdown,
and play an enormous part in the climate-change problem as well.""
Second, both share risks underestimations, especially climate
change." As a result, the president of a prominent climate-change-
focused coalition recommends that "all sectors of the economy in-
crease assessment of the risks presented by climate change."
The risk-management failure in financial institutions should give us
pause about how prepared corporate America is to manage environ-
mental crises."o Professor Fanto cogently captures the management
53. "Chief risk officers should report to the board and not the chief executive."
Kevin Brown, Too Big to Fail, WALL ST.J., Dec. 14, 2009, at R5. Significantly,
this was a leading recommendation by a "gatherjing] of 80 top financiers
[in] London for [the Wall Street Journal's] second annual Future of Fi-
nance Initiative, created to deliberate on the key steps to move out of the
recession." Alan Murray, Fixing the Global Financial System, WALL ST. J., Dec.
13, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870
4193004574587964095162166.html.
54. See Fanto, supra note 52, at 748. The purpose of Professor Fanto's article is
to assess the role of risk management in the current financial crisis. Id. at
731.
55. Patrick Walsh & Thomas J. Neff, hy Boards Need to Keep an Eye on Value
Creation, Bus. WK., Apr. 14, 2009, at 22, available at http://www.business
week.com/managing/content/apr2009/ca20090414_989435.htm.
56. Fanto, supra note 52, at 748.
57. Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the Management-Centered Corporation, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 702 (2009).
58. See Elizabeth Burleson, Symposium: Energy Policy, Intellectual Property, and
Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 69, 70 (2009) (referencing the Coalition for Environmentally Re-
sponsible Economies' ("CERES") president's parallel risk comparison of
the subprime mortgage lending catastrophe with climate change). The
proximate cause of the subprime lending debacle was the underestimation
of risk. Id.
59. Id. at 70 (citing Rachelle Younglai, Lifting The Lid: Banks Urged to Address
Climate Change, REUTERS, Jan. 14, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.planet
ark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/46393/story.htm).
60. See Fanto, supra note 52, at 755. Risk management will no longer be just a
"'mainstay' in financial companies, but . .. will be present in every Fortune
500 company." Diana Middleton, Landing a Job of the Future Takes a Two-
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and regulatory failures leading up to the global financial and eco-
nomic crises, and how these same types of failures in the future could
be an even bigger catastrophe with respect to climate change:
In the financial crisis, there was an excessive dependence
upon imperfect quantitative risk models, a reluctance to im-
agine adverse scenarios in stress testing, a failure of senior
decision makers to pay attention to risk management, often
because of a focus on short-term results, and regulatory pas-
sivity when dealing with risk management problems at a time
when the financial industry was profitable and looked safe.
All of these failings contributed to a worldwide financial cri-
sis and economic hardship. Similar failure in environmental
risk management, however, may well have a more cata-
strophic outcome.
This Article now segues to how a psychological syndrome can poten-
tially skew board decision-making and whether director expertise can
help stymie that effect.
2. Expertise and Groupthink
Unfortunately for boards of directors, several corporate governance
scholars have taken note that groupthink is pervasive in board-
rooms.12 "Groupthink occurs when a person's thought process and
decision-making capabilities become marred by peer pressure,"6 lead-
ing the board to the "relentless striving for unanimity," which ignores
mutual "trust [of] and respect [for] judgment and expertise. "64
Track Mind, WkLL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2009, at D4 (quoting Jeff Joerres, chair-
man and CEO of Manpower, a staffing firm).
61. Fanto, supra note 52, at 755. According to Bernhut, corporations are faced
with a hierarchy of six risks with respect to climate change: regulatory com-
pliance, physical risk, litigation risk, reputation risk, competitive risk, and
financing risk. Bernhut, supra note 23, at 22. Regulatory compliance cov-
ers both current and pending laws, which can be especially costly for a com-
pany if it has a global supply chain. Id. Bernhut explains the other types of
risk: "Physical risk [covers] the potential exposure of a company's assets
and properties to damage from climate-change-induced weather effects: lit-
igation risk [covers] personal injury or property damage caused by a com-
pany's alleged failure to adapt its properties or assets to climate-change-
related effects; [and both] reputational and competitive risk . . . result
[from] the perception of customers or clients to a company's action [or
inaction] on climate change: and financing risk [occurs] as investors and
lenders weigh their decisions in light of their assessment of a company's
climate risk." Id.
62. See N1arleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1233, n.30 (2003) (citing three scholars supporting this conclu-
sion about groupthink in the boardroom).
63. Rookmin Maharaj, Corporate Governance, Groupthink and Bullies in the Boar-
droom, 5 IN'L J. OF DISCLOSURE & Go1rRNANCE 68, 75 (2008).
64. L.A.A. Van den Berghe & Tom Baelden, The Complex Relation Between Direc-
tor Independence and Board Effectiveness, 5 CORPORATE GoxRNANCE 58, 62
(2005) (citation omitted).
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Faulty judgments are the result." Directors should be discerning
thinkers with independent minds, creating a board culture of "open
dissent.""" Irving Janis, the creator of the groupthink theory, sug-
gested that one of the most important ways to prevent groupthink is to
"formalize the role of the devil's advocate and rotate this position
among group members at each meeting.""7 This board dynamics tac-
tic empowers outside directors to collegially challenge inside
management."
Another dimension of group psychology that impacts board deci-
sion-making is the phenomenon of "'bounded rationality' which as-
serts that all humans have inherently limited memories,
computational skills, and other mental tools."" Under intricate and
vague conditions, rational decision-makers are limited in their abilities
to devise solutions and evaluate the outcomes of those solutions.7 0
"[T] he board of directors thus may have emerged as an institutional
governance mechanism to constrain the deleterious effect of bounded
rationality" within the corporate decision-making context.7'
In the complex case of climate change, the peer pressure of
groupthink and the cognitive myopia of bounded rationality could
collide when boards assess the risks of climate change for the com-
pany and shareholders. While some senior managers "may not per-
sonally agree with the scientific trend supporting human
contributions to climate change,"72 boards must seek to make peer
pressure-immune and unbounded rational decisions on global
warming.
Perhaps this proposition might bolster the need for a climate-
change scientist or scholar to serve as a board director on an audit
committee. In order to effectively sort through the complicated and
technical data on climate change, a "layer of expertise" between the
shareholder and the company is ideal.7 Indeed, this risk disclosure
will probably be drafted with the assistance of scientists and will likely
include scientific jargon and other unique features associated with the
technical writing typically utilized by the scientific community.74 Im-
agine a climate-change scientist on an audit committee, subjected to
the devil's advocate rotation. When it is the scientist's turn to play
65. See O'Connor, supra note 62, at 1239.
66. See Van den Berghe & Baelden, supra note 64, at 69.
67. O'Connor, supra note 62, at 1304.
68. Id. at 1241.
69. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1, 20 (2002).
70. Id. at 21.
71. Id.
72. See Jeffrey M. McFarland, Warming Up to Climate Change Risk Disclosure, 14
FoRDHAm. CORP. & FIN. L. 281, 298 (2009).
73. Id. at 322.
74. Id. at 321.
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devil's advocate to help the board stymie a possible attack of
groupthink and collective bounded rationality, the board may be able
to make more prudent climate-change decision alternatives.
3. Expertise on the Audit Committee
A revolution in board composition is afoot that recognizes the high
value of expertise on corporate boards of directors. Drawing a cogent
climate-change analogue requires beginning with the audit committee
reform that was primarily precipitated by the Enron catastrophe.
For over a decade, the empirical literature on board governance has
been powerfully testifying to the long-overdue and welcome renais-
sance in the need for director expertise.7 1 In the first five years follow-
ing the aftermath of Enron, section 406 of SOX required public
companies to disclose whether their boards had a financial expert on
the board audit committee, and, if not, why.7 7 "The percentage of
accountants on board audit committees has doubled and [this promis-
ing] trend appears likely to continue."7 1 Since it is axiomatic that the
75. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Symposium: The Dysfunctional Board: Causes and
Cures: Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the Empirical Literature,
77 U. CIN. L. REv. 465, 471 (2008).
76. Id. at 466-67. Professor Cunningham notes that this renaissance is "incho-
ate." Id. at 466. While it is clearly beyond the scope of this Article to ex-
amine the decades' long subordination of expertise to independence of
board members, Cunningham gives substantial treatment to this issue in his
article. Id. He observes that "empirical evidence shows that the combina-
tion of independence and expertise is uniquely valuable and should be en-
couraged." Id. at 467. Accordingly, this is one of the anchor concepts that
inspired and supports this Article.
77. Id. at 476.
78. Id. at 473-74. SOX mandates that the financial expert-director must qual-
ify as an expert through education and experience. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered
sections of U.S.C.). An easy way for boards to comply with this statutory
requirement is by appointing an active or retired accountant to the board.
Marc Goldstein, Mitigating Dysfunctional Deference Through Improvements in
Board Composition and Board Effectiveness, 103 Nw. U. L. RE-v. 490, 492 (2009).
Augmenting this Article's proposal that the SOX financial expert-director
mandate might be a tenable analogue for a climate-change specialist direc-
tor is the fact that the SEC carved out a "safe harbor" under SOX that
expressly provides that the designation or identification of a person as a
financial expert cannot be used as a basis for imposing private civil liability
on audit committee members. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qual-
ified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure
the Board of Directors, 53 DuKE L. J. 517, 571 (2003) (citations to the relevant
SEC releases omitted). Equally cogent is a prediction by a legal commenta-
tor that the financial expert on the audit committee would receive protec-
tion from increased liability under the Business Judgment Rule, as long as
that expert performs his or her duties with good faith. SeeJAGAN KRISHNAN
& JONG EUNLEE, AUDIT COMMITTEE FINANCIAL EXPERTISE, LITIcATION RISK,
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 244, n.7 (2009) (citation omitted).
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audit committee is "the most important board committee,"79 this con-
tinuing emergence of expertise is quite significant in itself.
Propitiously, researchers have found that the presence of a director
with accounting expertise on the audit committee improves corporate
governance and can lead to more faithful financial reporting.o Per-
haps this "faithful" reporting dynamic might translate into the same
for carbon footprint reporting if a climate-change specialist-director
served on the audit committee. Encouragingly, Professor Cunning-
ham predicted that in the future, SOX's success with financial exper-
tise would draw attention to other kinds of untapped director
expertise that were not yet fully exploited."1 In the context of board
recruitment, federal law provides that "expert directors face no differ-
ent or higher legal duty or liability than other directors."" Con-
versely, in Delaware, the courts hold expert directors to a "higher
79. See Cunningham, supra note 75, at 474 (citation omitted). Researchers
have found that companies with stronger boards are more likely to appoint
high-quality audit committees. KRiSHNAN & EUNLEE, supra note 78, at 4.
One business advisor makes an astute recommendation to boards about
auditing all board committees: "The board should audit committees to in-
sure compliance with corporate governance requirements. Healthy corpo-
rations tend to have more audit committees than financially troubled
firms." Phillip S. Scherrer, Directors' Responsibilities and Participation in the
Strategic Decision Making Process, 3 CoRP. GOVERNANCE 86, 90 (2003).
80. See Cunningham, supra note 75, at 499. Nevertheless, accountants will con-
tribute to accounting expertise on the audit committee only when those
professionals seek to and are "empowered to do so" by the corporation's
other governance structures. Id. at 482. Cunningham cites research hold-
ing that expertise-savvy corporations will more highly compensate expert
directors. Id. at 496. Perhaps boards should pay the climate-change direc-
tor specialist more compensation for that expertise, as well.
81. See Cunningham, supra note 75, at 484. For a proposal for expertise under
the rubric of the SEC's recommendation that companies establish disclo-
sure committees to better capture SOX internal control integrity, see Mar-
shall A. Geiger & Porcher L. Taylor, III, CEO and CFO Certifications of
Financial Information, 17 AccT. HoluzoNs 357, 362 (2003) ("We suggest that
a credit expert also be considered for such a committee, particularly in
light of the new policy by the largest credit-rating agencies to include evalu-
ations of accounting practices and policies in their creditworthiness re-
ports. Credit agencies might have more confidence in a company that has
a credit expert participate in monitoring disclosures.") This credit expert
proposal helped inspire this Article. Stakeholders may have more confi-
dence in a company that recruited and appointed a climate-change expert
to serve on the audit committee.
82. See Cunningham, supra note 75, at 498 (citations omitted to the SEC's re-
lease adopting final rules on audit committee financial experts). Fortu-
nately, the SEC further provides that the mere designation of the audit
committee financial expert does not increase the liabilities of directors in
general or audit committee members in particular. See PaulaJ. Dalley, Pub-
lic Company Corporate Governance under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28
OvLA. Crry U. L. REv. 185, 199 (2003) (citation omitted to the SEC's rele-
vant release statement on SOX).
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standard of performance."8 3 Thus, Delaware might be a less hospita-
ble venue for the type of green-board reform we propose.
III. Toward a Green Board: A Climate-Change Director as a Best
Practice
A. Carbon Footprint Reduction: Exemplary Companies
In the context of climate change, the highway toward a green board
is paved with two lanes of realization. First, "being green is no longer
simply a regulatory or public-relations concern for corporations," but
is considered a fundamental business strategy "essential to product de-
velopment, marketing, and corporate survival."8 4 Second, in this new
ecological age, companies must change how they are governed both
internally and externally in a world that is "Hot, Crowded, and Not-So-
Flat.""
Several companies should be lauded for their advancement down
this progressive highway of carbon mitigation. Google utilizes discus-
sion forums and e-mailings to facilitate employee carpooling. 6
FedEx, which deploys a flotilla of 700 aircraft and 44,000 motorized
vehicles, is replacing old aircraft with newer Boeing models, generat-
ing an expected reduction in fuel consumption of 36%, while increas-
ing capacity by 20%.7 Footwear retailer Timberland gives its
83. See Cunningham, supra note 75, at 497. As a result of Delaware's rigidly
high standards for expert-directors, Delaware faces a "more acute talent
pool contraction" for such directors. Id.
84. Herman F. Greene, Symposium: Hot, Crowded, and Not-So-Flat: The Changing
Climate for Corporations, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 799, 821 (2009). For those
corporations that respond with only "half measures" to GHG mitigation ef-
forts, Greene emphasizes that climate change is so ubiquitous that it has
"entered corporate board rooms, the curricula of business schools, associa-
tions of business leaders - even law schools!" Id. at 804. Sadly, the climate-
change arena is already hotly litigious, in what has become "an ambitious
legal war on oil, electric power, auto, and other companies whose emissions
are linked to global warming," with at least sixteen cases, drawing on a spec-
trum of legal strategies, pending in federal and state court as of October
2006. See John Carey & Lorraine Woellert, Global Warming: Here Come the
Lawyers, Bus. WK., Oct. 30, 2006, at 34, available at http://www.business
week.com/magazine/content/06_44/b4007044.htm. Some boards may be
walking on climate-change egg shells when it comes to business strategies
that might trigger adverse, knee-jerk reactions from the plaintiffs bar.
Consider that plans for a new coal plant in Australia were "scuttled" by a
lawsuit focusing on GHG emissions and the facility's contribution to global
warming. See DANIEL C. EsTy & ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN To GOLD: How
SMART COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE
VALUE, AND BUILD COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (Yale University Press, 2006).
85. Greene, supra note 84, at 810-11.
86. Bus. FOR Soc. RESPONSIBILITY, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: MOVING YOUR COMPANY
TOwARD CLIMATE LEADERSHIP 17 (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.bsr.
org/reports/BSRBeyond-Neutrality.pdf.
87. See Ram Nidumolu, et al., Why Sustainability is Now the Key Driver of Innova-
tion, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept. 2009 at 6.
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employees $3,000 towards the purchase of hybrid cars." Johnson &
Johnson uses an "Environmental Dashboard" to assess employees' per-
formance that entails determining whether GHG emissions are one
metric." Pharmaceutical and drug delivery specialist Alza Corpora-
tion pays its employees $1 per day when they bike, walk, or carpool to
work."' Swiss Re, an insurer of insurers, has an incentive program to
persuade employees to do such things as install solar panels." Procter
& Gamble created Tide Coldwater, a reformulated product that helps
customers wash their clothes in cool water, resulting in less energy
usage and cost savings." Since 1990, DuPont has reduced 70% of its
GHG emissions, resulting in a savings of $3 billion." By reducing the
venting of associated methane gas from its exploration and produc-
tion facilities, Shell was able to manage a significant portion of its pre-
2002 GHG emissions." Lastly, Honda and Toyota, with their highly
fuel-efficient fleets, have taken the lead in commercializing hybrid
vehicles."
On the GHG emissions reduction pledge front, several companies
stand out. Wal-Mart, whose over 2,400 supercenters consume enough
energy annually to power "a small African nation,"" has pledged to
eventually use 100% renewable energy and produce zero waste. 7 By
2010, Staples plans to draw most of its paper-based products from sus-
tainable-yield forests." General Electric has created a coal technology
to store carbon emissions underground and will designate $1.5 billion
per year to clean technologies."
Several companies are in the vanguard on the clean, renewable en-
ergy front. Virgin Airlines CEO Richard Branson has committed the
next ten years' profits (an estimated $3 billion) to create "the clean
88. Bus. FOR Soc. RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 86, at 18.
89. Id. at 16.
90. Id. at 18.
91. Mark Way & Britta Rendlen, Walking the Talk at Swiss Re, HARv. Bus. REv.
ONPOINT, Spring 2010, at 42.
92. Andrew S. Winston, Five Ways to Use (Green) Data to Make Money, HARv. Bus.
REV. ONPOINT BLOG (Nov. 19, 2009, 12:31 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/win-
ston/2009/11/five-ways-to-use-green-data-to.html.
93. Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and the New Environmentalism, 31 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. POL'Y REv. 291, 304 (2007) (citations omitted).
94. ANDREW J. HOFFMAN, PEW CENTER OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, GETTING
AHEAD OF THE CURVE: CORPORATE STRATEGIES THAT ADDRESS CLIMATE
CHANGE 113 (2007).
95. Jonathan Lash & Fred Wellington, Competitive Advantage on a Warming
Planet, HARv. Bus. REv. ONPOINT, Spring 2010, at 1.
96. B1UAN DUMAINE, THE PLOT TO SAVE THE PLANET: How VISIONARY ENTREPRE-
NEURS AND CORPORATE TITANS ARE CREATING REAL SOLUTIONS To GLOBAL
WARMING 36 (Three Rivers Press, 2008).
97. ANDREWJ. HoFFMAN, CARBON STRATEGIES: How LEADING COMPANIES ARE RE-
DUCING THEIR CLIMATE CHANGE FOOTPRINT 30 (Univ. of Michigan Press,
2007).
98. Nidumolu, et al., supra note 87, at 81.
99. See Dumaine, supra note 96, at 5.
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fuel of the future.""oo American Electric Power and FPL Energy are
among the electric utilities that are increasing their wind energy in-
vestments.10 1 Investing heavily in wind, solar, and nuclear power,
PG&E in California and FPL in Florida may be on the verge of captur-
ing a competitive advantage. 102 Cogently, nuclear power "exudes no
greenhouse gas."103
Two companies are major innovators in the field of re-engineering
of the manufacturing process. Nike has removed one of the most
harmful GHGs-sulfur hexafluoride-from the process it uses to fill
air pockets in its shoes.104 Similarly, Unilever has switched its freezer
technologies from hydro fluorocarbons to natural gas.10 5
This Article now turns its attention to boards that are leading the
charge toward climate-change literacy and initiative with board-level
committees and the like.
B. Green Board Exemplars
In 1989, the visionary CEO of DuPont, Ed Woolard, created and
implemented a Board-level Environmental Policy Committee. 0 6 He
also established an Environmental Leadership Council comprised of
senior executives who met monthly."0 ' This was particularly innova-
tive because "green issues were still off the radar screen for most of
corporate America" at that time.10 s This strategic move apparently
spawned the green-board movement.
Paradoxically, Brazilian energy giant Petrobras is a global leader in
sustainability and a "champion of renewable energy." 0 9 Petrobas is a
role-model board because it is intimately involved in the auditing of
Health, Safety, and Environment ("HSE") compliance of the com-
pany's business and service units and new projects.io With HSE pol-
icy as an explicit part of the company's strategic plan, the CEO and
the executive board review and approve the guidelines.' Senior, ex-
ecutive, and general managers have participated in more than 1,000
of these HSE audits, going on field trips to refineries, offshore plat-
100. Id. at 4.
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id. at 35.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Sullivan, supra note 23, at 309.
105. Id.
106. EsT' & WINsTON, supra note 84, at 206.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Jose Sergio Gabrielli de Azevedo, The Greening of Petrobras, HARV. Bus.
REv., Spring 2010, at 44.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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forms, and pipelines.' 2 In twenty-eight of these audit site inspections,
either the CEO or one of the Petrobras directors joined in the visit."'
American Electric Power ("AEP"), the U.S.'s largest burner of
coal,"' also stands out as a carbon-savvy board. In the Institutional
Shareholder Services' ("1ISS") 115 2006 assessment of 100 global compa-
nies, ISS assigned 12 of 100 points to board activity, such as the assign-
ment of environmental issues to a specific board committee."' Of
this group, not many companies scored well, including General Elec-
tric, which enjoys top industry rankings for overall climate-change pol-
icy."' AEP, with its engaged board, shined as a leader.' 1 8
How did AEP obtain this high board rating? In 2004, AEP's policy
board committee conducted a study examining the effects of climate
change on AEP."' With regard to its new power plants, AEP evalu-
ated how legislation might impact its long-term investments.1 20 As of
2007, the board committee still oversaw climate-change and the firm's
first sustainability report issued in 2007.121
Dow Chemical has formed a unique task force focused on integra-
tion of board oversight and executive actions to regulate GHG emis-
sions.' 22 General Motors and Ford have similarly implemented a
mandatory disclosure policy for emissions and climate risks integra-
tion. 12 General Electric has also sought to reap reputational fruits
from its innovative "ecomagination" campaign.' 2 ' Nike has a board-
level Corporate Social Responsibility Committee, which includes the
112. Id. at 45.
113. Id.
114. See Climate Change and the Environment, AEP: AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER,
www.aep.com/environmental/climatechange/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
115. Because ISS is the largest and "most influential" corporate governance-rat-
ing agency, rating more than 8,000 companies in 31 countries, the authors
of this Article submit that this is a significant assessment. See Thuy-Nga T.
Vo, Rating Management Behavior and Ethics: A Proposal to Upgrade the Corporate
Governance Rating Criteria, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 4, 5 (2008).
116. See Cunningham & Bernstein, supra note 21, at 46.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. Flawed corporate structure can even hurt companies that have the best
of strategic intentions in mind on climate change. Consider as Exhibit A
the global energy giant, Shell. As far as Shell's climate change-strategy for-
mulations, it had languished somewhat on its carbon-reduction commit-
ment, in part because of organizational structure barriers, including having
more than one board. See Ingvild Andreassen Saeverud & Jon Birger
Skjaerseth, Oil Companies and Climate Change: Inconsistencies Between Strategy
Formulation and Implementation, 7 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 42, 56-57 (2007).
120. Id.
121. See Cunningham & Bernstein, supra note 21, at 46.
122. Id. at 45.
123. Id.
124. Id; see also ANDREw J. HOFFMAN & JOHN G. WOODY, CLIMATE CHANGE:
WHAT'S YOUR BUSINESS STRATEGY? 71 (Harv. Bus. Press, 2008). Unsurpris-
ingly, researchers have found that companies in the energy and power in-
dustry are more likely to have board subcommittees organized around
233
234 University of Baltimore Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 18
monitoring of green issues material to the company,'12 while "Alcoa
relies on three dedicated teams to further its climate change and en-
ergy efficiency goals: Corporate Climate Change Strategy Team,
Greenhouse Gas Network, and Energy Efficiency Network."'12
Four other companies are worthy of mention in this green board
context. Employing a cross-functional, high-level team approach,
Whirlpool keeps a strategic eye on climate change through its Envi-
ronmental Council, consisting of representatives from its six geo-
graphically dispersed business units. 127 Swiss Re, a pioneer in carbon
mitigation, obtained support from its executive board to create and
staff Greenhouse Gas Risk Solutions, which sought ways to profit from
carbon reduction.'2 8 Bayer has a renewable raw materials working
group and an executive climate-change Corporate Sustainability
Board. 1 29 In similar governance structure, International Paper's Pub-
lic Policy & Environmental Board Committee reviews all of its climate-
change and related policies.so
Two legal commentators advocate that boards should establish an
environmental affairs committee, consisting of directors, including in-
dependent directors, with direct oversight of that arena, with at least
one director from the audit committee.'' This Article goes further
and advocates the appointment of a climate-change expert director to
the nerve center of the board: the audit committee. That director
would be the most logical choice to simultaneously serve on the envi-
ronmental affairs committee, should a company have such a board-
level committee. Conversely, the presence of a climate-change direc-
public policy or environmental safety and health. See Morgan, et al., supra
note 22, at 46.
125. CORO STRANDBERG, THE CONFERENCE BD. OF CAN., THE ROLE OF THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS IN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 17 (June 2008).
126. See Hoffman, supra note 94, at 104.
127. Id. at 125.
128. HOFFMAN, supra note 94, at 78-79.
129. BuS. FOR Soc. RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 86, at 15.
130. Id. at 16.
131. See David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual Mate-
riality and Divergent Disclosure- The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Mate-
rial Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 137, 198 (2007). At the
management level, companies should create the position of chief environ-
mental officer who would report directly to the CEO and board-level envi-
ronmental affairs committee. Id. Establishing climate-change non-board-
level advisory boards might serve as a stepping stone toward actually placing
a director expert on the board, or as an adjunct to a board that has such an
expert. For example, companies like Dow, Unilever, and Coca-Cola, have
established environmental or sustainability advisory boards that regularly
meet with company officials, with the explicit goal of obtaining peer review
feedback from independent experts. EsTY & WINSTON, supra note 84, at
187. This advisory board strategy gives companies the chance to speak with
top NGO leaders, academics, and environmental management experts
about emerging issues, providing possible prescience on horizon events.
Id.
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tor on the audit committee might, governance-wise, complement the
environmental affairs committee.
C. Recruiting the Climate-Change Director
In a utopian world, there are three questions that boards should ask
to find and recruit a top-talent, climate change-savvy director. First,
what is the ideal professional or career background of such a candi-
date? Second, what are the quintessential attributes of that director?
Lastly, where are the most promising venues to find and recruit this
board candidate?
Two researchers have developed seven criteria to best judge
whether a director is "financially trained" enough to fulfill SOX's
mandate that such a finance expert serve on the audit committee in
the catastrophic wake of Enron's demise.' This Article creatively
analogizes those criteria to discover a qualified climate-change direc-
tor as follows: (1) a sustainability scientist or scholar from industry, or
a sustainability professor or professor of environmental law from a col-
lege or university; (2) a certified climate-change expert; (3) a director
or CEO of a firm in a carbon-intensive industry; (4) a GHG manage-
ment or chief environmental or sustainability officer from another
company; (5) a partner from a climate-change consulting firm; (6) a
partner from an investment firm that focuses primary on high-tech
green initiatives; or (7) a former administrator of the EPA or the UN's
Environment Program.
Clif Bar, a natural food company that aggressively seeks to reduce
its ecological footprint in its entire product process chain, 33 has al-
ready brought environmental science expertise in house, a possible
step toward our proposal of appointing such an expert to the audit
committee.13 1 Clif Bar hired a Yale-trained ecologist to work full-time
on the firm's sustainability initiatives.1 33
132. See Kam C. Chan & Joanre Li, Audit Committee and Firm Value: Evidence on
Outside Top Directors as Expert-Independent Directors, 16 CORP. GovERNANCE 16,
19 (2008).
133. Our Planet, CLIF BAR, http://www.clifbar.com/soul/our-planet (last visited
Mar. 10, 2011).
134. Id. (click on "CB&C hires a full time ecologist").
135. Es-y & WINSTON, supra note 84, at 187. In 2007, Directorship magazine, a
widely read publication in the corporate governance field, asked two of the
leading experts on board practice to make recommendations for 'dream'
eco-savvy board candidates, which Directorship combined with its own list.
See Cunningham & Bernstein, supra note 21, at 45-46. Those twenty-two
candidates nicely fit one or more of our above criteria. As a sampling, here
are the names and titles of six of those candidates: Riley P. Bechtel, Chair-
man/CEO of Bechtel Corp.; Paul R. Epstein, MD, MPH, Associate Director
of the Center for Health and the Global Environment at Harvard Medical
School; Lee Higdon, President of Connecticut College; Steven J. McCor-
mick, President/CEO of The Nature Conservancy; Jim Rogers, the Chair-
man/CEO of Duke Energy; and Mark Tercek, Managing Director of the
Goldman Sachs Center for Environmental Markets. Id.
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At this juncture, the authors of this Article concur with Professor
McFarland's transparency proposal that every publicly-held company
should be required to include a statement in its annual report regard-
ing the board's and management's involvement in addressing "cli-
mate change risk.""' This simple statement should address board
frequency on receiving updates on company climate-change policies
and actions, and the titles of executives in charge of addressing cli-
mate-change risk."' We go one step further and submit that the ac-
tual name and very short biography of the climate-change director on
the audit committee be revealed in the annual report, along with the
fact that the director serves on the audit committee.
Beyond the ostensible collegial personality, team player,"' innova-
tor, and good judgment traits that any board director must possess,
this Article highlights eight knowledge-based qualities that a board
should aspire to find and probe to find in a climate-change expert
worthy of serving on the audit committee. The first quality is whether
a candidate fully recognizes the strong business case for sustainability.
Consider the provocative research assertion derived from examining
about 200 sustainability case studies on risks and opportunities: "by
integrating sustainability strategies into the fabric of their business,
large companies can increase profit by a minimum of 38% over five
years, and small and medium-sized companies can increase their
profit by a minimum of 66% in the same time frame."1 3 1
The second quality is whether the board candidate understands
that sustainability "is now the key driver of innovation."1 4 0 Since re-
search shows that sustainability is a virtual bonanza of organizational
and technological innovations that yield both bottom-line and top-line
136. See McFarland, supra note 72.
137. Id. at 292-93.
138. Since -many companies don't have the necessary IT systems that will allow
them to capture and report their emissions completely and accurately," the
CFO must become the ultimate leader responsible for emissions reporting
and all other climate-change reporting requirements, and since offsetting
accounting could become a "make-or-break" point in an accountant's ca-
reer certainly the climate-change director must be a team player in particu-
lar vis a vis the corporate CIO, CFO and accountants. See Bernhut, supra
note 23.
139. Id. As far as tangible savings for becoming carbon-neutral, Dell has stepped
up to the plate by purchasing energy credits, increasing efficiency, and re-
ducing emissions. See Katherine Harmon, Top 25 Green Energy Leaders,
ScLAMER. EARTH 3.0: SOLUTIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE PROGRESs (Summer
2009), at 39. As a direct impact on the bottom line, Dell saved $3 million,
thereby "disproving skeptical claims that running [a business] on green
technology is bad for staying in the black." Id.
140. See Ram Nidumolu, C.K. Prahalad & M. R. Rangaswami, Why Sustainability is
Now the Key Driver of Innovation, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept. 2009, at 57-58, availa-
ble at http://hbr.org./2009/09/why-sustainability-is-now-the-key-driver-of-
innovation/es.
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returns, only companies that make sustainability a goal will gain com-
petitive advantage.' 4 '
With the paucity in the necessary IT systems that many companies
face in voluntarily capturing and reporting their emissions completely
and accurately, the board candidate needs to be asked about the acu-
ity of his or her information systems skills.' 4 2 Given this technological
deficit, the authors of this Article wonder how complete and accurate
company carbon footprint reporting has been in recent years. Ap-
proximately 75% of the corporate respondents to a 2006 survey by the
Conference Board stated they were measuring their footprints, or the
direct/indirect emissions of their operations.1 4 3 At that time, it was
questionable whether all of those companies were maintaining the
necessary data management controls. Since this predates any federal
law or EPA regulations requiring carbon footprint disclosure, like
SOX does on the financial reporting side of internal controls compli-
ance, there may be no external assurance of the data integrity of some
of these good-faith efforts by corporate America. The board candi-
date and the audit committee will need to better review and oversee
this disclosure process.
On an encouraging note, Shell should be commended for its volun-
tary elevation of sustainability practices to a quasi-SOX standard. All
Shell executive officers must draft and execute an 'assurance letter'
promising their adherence to Shell's sustainability priorities, just as
CEOs and CFOs must pledge the veracity of the amounts in their fi-
nancial statements under SOX.14 4 This might mean that Shell busi-
ness leaders are also swearing by the veracity of their carbon
footprints. In any case, this may be a practice worthy of adoption by
the near ubiquity of companies that fall under climate change's broad
shadow. A perspective board candidate should be attuned to this kind
of strategic thinking.
Further, the board candidate should be politically savvy enough to
know that companies might need to ask government for "stricter"
GHG emission regulations, in stark contrast to virtually all lobbying
efforts that are aimed at stopping new regulations.14 While this may
sound counter-intuitive to the profit-focused mind, it can actually gen-
erate a competitive advantage when employed under the right circum-
stances, as evidenced by DuPont gaining market share and profits
when it did not fight the Montreal Protocol's phase out of production
of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons.1 46
141. Id.
142. See Bernhut, supra note 23.
143. CFO Staff, Feeling the Heat, CFO MAGAZINE (Dec. 1, 2006), http://www.cfo.
com/article.cfm/8191534?f=singlepage.
144. Esny & WINSTON, supra note 84, at 217.
145. Id. at 121 (describing the concept of the value of "stricter" regulations).
146. Id. at 141-42.
238 University of Baltimore Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 18
With "salient stakeholders" like government, non-governmental or-
ganizations ("NGOs"), investors, suppliers, customers, and competi-
tors having placed climate change on corporate agendas,'4 7 the ideal
board candidate should have some professional experience with at
least one or more of these influential players. The potential benefits
to corporations of effective stakeholder management are well estab-
lished in the corporate citizenship literature as such activities can en-
hance the firm's reputation, improve desirability for potential
employees, improve efficiency, boost a corporation's image, reduce
capital costs, and, perhaps most importantly, limit risks.'4 8 Most sig-
nificantly, even the Chancellors of the highly influential Delaware
Chancery Court have pointed out that the "fair treatment of [corpo-
rate] stakeholders may be instrumentally useful in creating share-
holder wealth." 4 9
In fact, stakeholder concepts are codified in state corporation codes
to encourage corporate directors to consider the interests not only of
shareholders, but of others, such as employees, consumers, suppliers,
creditors, and communities, in making certain corporate manage-
ment decisions.'o The climate-change board specialist could help
strategize new ways to engage these stakeholders.'
Given that shareholder proposals are essential to inducing climate-
change-related disclosure, analysis, and action, prompting even some
action where the company prefers to take none,1 5 2 the board should
seek a candidate who is well-versed in proxy resolution strategy.
147. See Ans Kolk & Jonatan Pinske, Towards Strategic Stakeholder Management? In-
tegrating Perspectives on Sustainability Challenges Such as Corporate Responses to
Climate Change, 7 CORP. GOVERNANCE 370, 371 (2007).
148. See Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility
into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 631, 652 (2009) (citations
omitted). As a result, many corporations now pursue paths that garner
measurable return in terms of both finances and the social good. Id.
149. Id. at 651 (citation omitted).
150. See Perry E. Wallace, Global Climate Change and the Challenge to Modern Corpo-
rate Governance, 55 SMU L. REv. 493, 513 n.103 (2002) (citation omitted).
151. A crucial part of stakeholder management, especially in the environmental
arena, is creating partnerships with and disarming NGOs through co-opta-
tion, particularly sometimes hostile ones like Greenpeace. Partnering is a
strong defense against NGO attacks, as it is difficult for NGOs effectively
"attack their own partnerships." EsTrY & WINsTON, supra note 84, at 186.
For example, witness FedEx's partnership with Environmental Defense to
develop a new generation of hybrid delivery vehicles. See HOFFMAN &
WOODY, supra note 124, at 69. Since some researchers foresee potential
radical changes in corporate governance on the horizon, including prac-
tices that would encourage "formal" stakeholder representation on the
board and regular interaction between board sub-committees and various
stakeholders, a corporate board might do well to appoint a director expert
from the stakeholder world. See Morgan, et al., supra note 22, at 48.
152. Elise N. Rindfleisch, Shareholder Proposals: A Catalyst for Climate Change-Re-
lated Disclosure, Analysis and Action?, 5 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 45, 78 (2008).
153. See id. at 60-61.
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Boards are certainly attuned to these proxies, and corporations will
often address them in such a way that the shareholders withdraw the
resolution.' In 2005, there was a decade record of over 111 propos-
als withdrawn, thirty-four of which were related to climate change. 1 5
Out of that batch, sixteen were withdrawn due to each affected corpo-
ration's agreement to adopt a resolution.'1" In recent years, large oil
and gas companies such as Anadarko Petroleum Corporation,' 5 7 Co-
nocoPhillips,15 and ExxonMobil" 1 stand out as examples of boards
that enticed shareholders to withdraw their proposals.""o
Deliberately exaggerating a company's commitment to green issues
through disingenuous marketing, euphemistically called "greenwash-
ing," can potentially tarnish a company's brand or image and could
lead to lost sales."' Recruitment-wise, a board might want its climate-
change expert candidate to have some basic familiarity with marketing
to help avoid this trap. Royal Dutch Shell has been censured twice by
Britain's Advertising Standards Authority for greenwashing and drawn
the ire of NGOs like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth for past
efforts to extol its green duty.16 2
While Shell last year rolled out a new ad campaign stressing the
potential global warming-reduction role of technology and innova-
tion, the effort has backfired with the revival of greenwashing
claims.' 6' Especially in the energy industry, it may become imperative
for board audit committees to review climate-change focused market-
ing literature that comes out of the corporate communications office.
In partnership with the company's Human Resources ("HR") Direc-
tor, the climate-change director could help spearhead an employee
retention and morale initiative that may position the company for a
faster post-recession recovery. Intriguing new research on workforce
engagement supports the proposition that "the ultimate goal, espe-
cially during a recession, is to improve your company's performance
and competitive position through green strategy."1 6 4 This will stimu-
late extreme loyalty and energy among the work force, accelerating
154. Id. at 61.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 62-65.
158. Rindfleisch, supra note 152, at 65-67.
159. Id. at 67-70.
160. Id. at 78.
161. See, e.g., Guy Chazan, Shell's Green Ads Take New Track, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2,
2009, at B4, available at http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2009/02/03/shalls-
green-ads-take-new-tack/.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Andrew Winston, Energize Employees with Green Strategy, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Sept. 2009, at 24, available at http://hbr.org/2009/09/energize-employees-
with-green-strategy/ar/1.
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recession recovery and, most likely, profitability.' One pioneering
sustainability leader, with five decades of business experience, has
found that sustainability uniquely galvanizes employees to turn a com-
pany around.' 6 On the front end of workforce engagement, compa-
nies that pursue sustainability may find it easier to hire and retain
talent, as recent research suggests that 75% of workforce entrants in
the U.S. consider social responsibility and green commitment as sig-
nificant factors in selecting employers.' 7 In light of the potent role
of green strategy in workforce engagement, the board might question
a climate-change candidate about any past HR interaction.
Now armed with a new climate-change director, the audit commit-
tee is ready to tackle the "five significant bodies of information.""'s
These include: (1) the emerging climate change science; (2) the rele-
vance of that science to their business; (3) the position of stakeholders
on climate change; (4) the management responses to climate-change-
related opportunities, risks, and shareholder initiatives; and (5) the
consequences of all of the preceding in the company's capital
markets. "6
These five climate-change knowledge areas are relatively analogous
to and overlap with the nine board due diligence duties that Ceres, a
stakeholder group, advocates for a prudent board.170 Cogently, the
first Ceres duty is a prima facie call for expertise in order to make
informed and responsible decisions regarding climate change,n17
which resonates with the cardinal theme of this Article.
Adhering to these practices above may insulate directors from per-
sonal liability and valuable time spent in litigation. Professor of law,
Nadelle Grossman, posits that "compliance with best practices may be
a director's insurance policy against the risks that he will be held lia-
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Nidumolu, supra note 87, at 64.
168. Jeffrey A. Smith & Matthew Morreale, The Fiduciary Duties of Officers and
Directors, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAw 497, 528 (Michael B.
Gerrard ed., 2007).
169. Id.
170. See Jeffrey A. Smith, The Implications of the Kyoto Protocol and the Global Warm-
ing Debate for Business Transactions, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 511, 525 n. 34
(2005). The nine points are: (1) ensuring adequate company expertise re-
garding climate-change; (2) ensuring that the company's potential conse-
quences of climate-change are thoroughly managed; (3) ensuring that the
company's potential expansion and growth because of climate-change is
assessed; (4) monitoring competitors' best practices for addressing climate-
change; (5) developing a climate-change strategy that correlates to the busi-
ness strategy; (6) basing executive pay on the company's fulfillment of cli-
mate-change objectives; (7) considering new potential alliances and
arrangements; (8) ensuring proper disclosure of climate-change risk to
shareholders; and (9) upholding accountability to monitor the company's
progress in achieving these goals. Id.
171. Id.
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ble for having breached his fiduciary duties, or that he will be rebuked
for failing to employ best practices," even for actions taken in bad
faith. 1 2 For partial support of her argument, Grossman cites former
Delaware Chief Justice Veasey: "'Good corporate practices, when gen-
uinely used, in my view, would perforce and simultaneously lead direc-
tors to act in good faith.'""7  Notwithstanding this insurance policy
view of best practices, this Article now examines this argument and
others at the intersection of climate change and the business judg-
ment rule.
IV. Protecting Board Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule
Directors on a corporation's board have a duty to the corporation's
shareholders to exercise due care and loyalty to the corporation in
making decisions for the corporation. The business judgment rule,
which has existed in some form in United States law for the past 180
years,' 7 guides courts in determining when a corporation's board of
directors is liable for business decisions' 75 that shareholders allege
harmed the corporation. Historically, courts have shown great defer-
ence to directors' decisions-the rule refers to the presumption that
directorial decisions are a product of business judgments and beyond
the reach of judicial intervention. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme
Court has stated " [t] he business judgment rule exists to protect and
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to
Delaware directors."17 6 Until recently, the business judgment rule
only required that "(1) the directors are disinterested and indepen-
dent [or] (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of
a valid exercise of business judgment."17 7
In recent years, though, three major developments have arguably
eroded boards' wide latitude in making business decisions without
fear of liability. Recent Delaware cases apparently increase the bur-
172. Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Cli-
mate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FoRDHA J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 463
(2007). Grossman further contends that this may help avoid time-consum-
ing litigation, as the director's conduct will, at minimum, be on par with
shareholders' expectations. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829).
175. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Duty of Care: Riddles
Wisely Expounded, 24 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 923, 947-49, 947 n. 129 (1990) (pro-
vides a list of cases finding director liability for breaching the duty of care
through inaction or inattention). Note, the business judgment rule ap-
plies only to affirmative director action; it generally does not apply to direc-
tor inattention or inaction. See id. In the case of inattention, courts will
usually apply a simple negligence standard, depending upon that state's
standards. See id. In Delaware, the Rales test is used in the case of director
inattention. See discussion infra Part IV.A.ii.
176. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled in part on
other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n. 54 (Del. 2009).
177. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
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den of care directors must exercise in making business decisions. 178
Similarly, SOX mandates that boards and board members take greater
legal responsibility for their decisions."' Finally, recent corporate
scandals, and the litigation stemming from them, have possibly fur-
ther weakened the protections afforded to boards by the business
judgment rule. 18 o The effect of each of these developments is consid-
ered in turn below.
A. Highly Infonned Business Decision-Making: A Legal Mandate
1. The New Business Judgment Rule Standard
In the past, courts were highly deferential to board decisions; how-
ever, recent Delaware cases have placed a greater burden on direc-
tors' decision-making, and even gone so far as to permit judicial
inquiry into the merits of the decision, rather than deferring to direc-
tor judgment where directors followed appropriate procedures in ar-
riving at their decisions.
In Aronson v. Lewis,' 8 ' the Delaware court laid out the main bounda-
ries of the modern business judgment rule: "[t]he business judgment
rule . . . is a presumption that in making a business decision the direc-
tors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the decision was in the best interests of the com-
pany."182 In so pronouncing its rule, the Aronson court added a third
requirement to the business judgment rule: directors must be in-
formed."' In prior formulations to Aronson, this requirement "was
conspicuously missing."184 In a subsequent decision,' the court used
this formulation "as a tool to allow it to probe directors' decisions
about policy and business management, even though the court ac-
knowledged that there were 'no allegations of fraud, bad faith, or, self-
dealing."""
178. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
179. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
180. See discussion infra Part V.C.
181. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). David A. Skeel, Jr. states that "Aronson may well
be the single most frequently cited corporate law case of the past three
decades." David A. Skeel Jr., The Accidental Elegance ofAronson v. Lewis (U.
Penn. Inst. for L. & Econ, Research Paper No. 07-28, 2007), available at
SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1027010.
182. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
183. Id. at 812-13.
184. Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business judgment Rule, 55 Bus. L. 625, 640
(2000).
185. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
186. John Jenkins, The Decline and Fall of the Business judgment Rule, CORP. Gov-
ERNANCE ADvISOR, May/June 2009, at 3 (quoting Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at
873).
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In Brehm v. Eisner,'"7 the Delaware court seemingly retreated from
its previous broad reach. Even though the Court inquired into and
found that the board had made a bad business decision regarding the
employment and severance package of an executive,"" it held that the
business judgment rule protected the board because the board had
followed the procedures outlined in Aronson and Van Gorkom.'"' The
fact that the Court chose to address the "goodness" of the board's
decisions was troubling-ordinarily, following the business judgment
procedural safeguards had been enough to cut off litigation at the
outset.1so
In re Caremark Derivative Litigation has been, so far, the high-water
mark of the Delaware court's willingness to judicially review business
judgments of boards. In that case, the court expanded the board's
duty of care with respect to its oversight of operations:
[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good
faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting
system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and
that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in the-
ory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-
compliance with applicable legal standards. 91
This language, while seemingly benign, imposes affirmative duties
even greater than those of prior cases for directors to inform them-
selves about the corporation's information and reporting systems, and
to conclude favorably on itl9 2 -altogether, much more than had been
required in the past. Taken together, these cases modify the business
judgment rule to a remarkable degree such that the deference once
afforded to board decisions has been eroded and director duties of
oversight have never been higher."9 s
187. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). This suit was an appeal from the dismissal of a
derivative action against Eisner's (then-CEO and member of the board)
company, Walt Disney Co. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d
342 (Del. Ch. 1998).
188. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 266.
189. Id. at 264.
190. As the court in In re Caremark Derivative Litig. observes: "[W]hether ajudge
or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substan-
tively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious'
or 'irrational', provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court
determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a
good faith effort to advance corporate interests." 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.
Ch. 1996)
191. Id. at 970.
192. Id.
193. One scholar even claims "the business judgment rule is for all intents and
purposes dead." Jenkins, supra note 186, at 2. While this is an overstate-
ment, it does stand to reason that the nearly impervious shield of the busi-
ness judgment rule is no longer so protective.
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2. Board Oversight and the Rales Test
Even where there is no cognizable decision to which the business
judgment rule would ordinarily apply,1 9" boards may still be held lia-
ble for their very decision to do nothing in their capacity as overseers
of the corporation.19 5 As recently as June 2009, in In re Intel Corp.
Derivative Litigation,"' a federal district court in Delaware reaffirmed
that allegations of harm to the corporation stemming from board in-
action must be evaluated under Delaware law using the Rales test, not
the business judgment rule."' In Rales v. Blasbund,"'9 the court held
that Aronson did not apply to board inaction regarding a potential bus-
iness decision:
Consistent with the context and rationale of the Aronson de-
cision, a court should not apply the Aronson test for demand
futility where the board that would be considering the de-
mand did not make a business decision which is being chal-
lenged in the derivative suit. This situation would arise ...
where the subject of the derivative suit is not a business deci-
sion of the board. 99
Though it remains to be seen if or how this test would be applied in
a climate-change inaction context by a board, it is at least clear that
courts are willing to entertain claims and uphold liability for board
inaction in general. That the board made no "decision," as conceived
and required in the application of the typical business judgment rule,
is not absolution of possible liability.2 0 0 Indeed, absent law or regula-
tion otherwise compelling private action, doing nothing about climate
change is probably the default for private entities like boards. In such
cases, the Rales doctrine may be another legal hook upon which
boards indifferent to issues such as climate change are caught.
194. "The business judgment rule does not apply to monitoring or oversight du-
ties in which no decision is being made." Perry E. Wallace, Climate Change,
Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate Disclosure: Are Things Heating Up in the Boar-
droom? 26 VA. ENvrL. L.J. 293, 327 (2008). Of course, this statement is true
without regard to the environmental context of the decision. See Ann M.
Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation: The
Delaware Courts' Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FLA. L. REv. 589, 622
(2008) ("It is axiomatic that the business judgment rule applies only to sce-
narios involving a 'businessjudgment.' Thus, the board must actually make
a decision to invoke the business judgment rule.")
195. See In re: Intel Corp. Derivative Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d 165,173 (D. Del.
2009).
196. 621 F.Supp.2d 165 (D. Del. 2009).
197. Id. at 170 (D. Del. 2009) ("'where the subject of a derivative suit is not a
business decision of the Board but rather a violation of the Board's over-
sight duties,' the trial court must apply the Rales test." (quoting Wood v.
Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008))).
198. 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993).
199. Id. at 933-34.
200. See id.
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B. SOX: Supra-Prudent Business DeciSions?
SOX touches on many areas of corporate disclosure,"201 account-
ing,2o2 and corporate responsibility.20 In the area of corporate gov-
ernance, SOX created new, individual liability for the CEOs and CFOs
of most SEC registrant corporations with regard to the accuracy and
completeness of the corporation's financial statements.2 "o Before
SOX, the CEO and CFO were arguably shielded from personal liabil-
ity for financial statement misstatements so long as the processes fol-
lowed were reasonable under general business judgment rule
considerations. Now, the CEO and CFO must sign and certify the fi-
nancial statements, and are, therefore, individually liable for known
misstatements they contain. 20" Note, company officer signatories to
the Management Representation Letter, which is required under Gen-
erally Accepted Auditing Principles, have previously made representa-
tions as to the accuracy of the financial statements, but did not
necessarily take on personal liability for those decisions. 20 Liabilities
stemming from misstatements could be paid by the corporation prior
to SOX. 207 Now, signatories to the certification of company financial
statements take on personal liability for misstatements contained
therein. 20 8
While this additional layer of liability has already had a general im-
pact on life in the boardroom, it arguably modifies, in small but im-
portant ways, the outlines of the business judgment doctrine. In
passing SOX, "Congress has federalized and diluted the business judg-
ment rule, paving the way for courts to second-guess boards with non-
business hindsight."20 9 Underlying the business judgment rule is the
principle that risk-taking and profit-maximization are to be en-
couraged in the corporate context. Those corporations that success-
fully leverage risk into profit reward investors, and investors may
201. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, §§ 401-403, 407409, 116 Stat.
745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
202. Id. at §§ 101-109.
203. Id. at §§ 301-308.
204. The Corporate Responsibility provisions of Title III of the Act apply to
"each company filing periodic reports under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 78o(d)). . .." Id. at
§ 302(a). Suffice it to say, most companies considered "public" in the gen-
eral sense fall under this regulation.
205. Id.
206. See Ronaled E. Marden et al., The CEO/CFO Certification Requirement, CPA
JouRNAL, July 2003, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2003/
0703/features/f073603.htm (discussing auditor's duties under "SAS 85,
Management Representations') .
207. Id. The terms of employment for any signatory plausibly could have re-
quired that the signatory accept personal liability in connection with mis-
statements in the financial statements-but this was not the default rule.
Id.
208. Id.
209. Porcher L. Taylor, III, Dangerfor Directors, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 17, 2003, at A13.
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reduce the effects of exposure to poor business decisions by diversify-
ing their investments. 2 10
C. The Legacy of the Corporate Scandals from the Recession of 2008-2009
Starting in late 2007 the U.S. economy, which had been growing at
an unprecedented rate, fueled by easy credit and skyrocketing real
estate prices, first showed signs of major weakness.2 1' Congress au-
thorized $152 billion in stimulus spending, sent to individuals in an
attempt to kick start the economy in February 2008.212 A seemingly
impervious Wall Street bank, Bear Stearns, verged on collapse 2 13 until
it was rescued by the U.S. government in March of that year. 1 4 Al-
though Lehman Brothers, another bank, was allowed to fail six
months later, 1 5 American Insurance Group ("AIG"), the largest U.S.
insurer, was rescued by the government shortly thereafter.216
Most recently, in In re Citigroup Derivative Litigation,2 17 the Delaware
Chancery Court modified (and softened) the potentially far-reaching
business judgment rule implications of the Court's earlier denial of
summary judgment in a similar case regarding the insurance giant
AIG.2 1  The Court distinguished Citigroup from AIG, and in so doing,
clarified the import of the AIG court's decision to allow the suit to
proceed against directors who failed to act against an environment of
fraud.2 1' The court stated:
There are significant differences between failing to oversee
employee fraudulent or criminal conduct and failing to rec-
ognize the extent of a Company's business risk. Directors
should, indeed must under Delaware law, ensure that reason-
able information and reporting systems exist that would put
210. This rationale for the business judgment rule is espoused in Gagliardi v.
Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1996).
211. For a thorough narrative of the credit crisis' timeline, see Zachary A. Gold-
farb & Alec Klein, The Bubble: Anatomy of a Meltdown: Credit Crisis Part 2,
WASH. PosT, June 16, 2008, available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/ 15/AR2008061501949.html?sid=ST008061
1600096&s pos.-.
212. The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (2008).
213. Stephen Bernard & Joe Bel Bruno, Fed and Rival Bail Out Bear Stearns, Hur-
FINcTON POST, Mar. 14, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/03/
14/fed-and-rival-bail-out-be_1_n_91557.html.
214. Joseph Giannone & Dane Hamilton, Fed Comes to Bear Stearns' Rescue,
REUTERS, Mar. 15, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSN1438968020080315.
215. See Timeline: Crisis on Wall Street, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/business/economy-watch/timeline/index.html (last visited
Mar. 29, 2011).
216. Tami Luhby, Fed in AIG Rescue-$85B Loan, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 17, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/16/news/companies/AIG/index.htm.
217. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
218. See AIG v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009).
219. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 130-31.
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them on notice of fraudulent or criminal conduct within the
company. Such oversight programs allow directors to inter-
vene and prevent frauds or other wrongdoing that could ex-
pose the company to risk of loss as a result of such conduct.
While it may be tempting to say that directors have the same
duties to monitor and oversee business risk, imposing
Caremark-type duties on directors to monitor business risk is
fundamentally different.2 2 0
Although the business judgment rule has been forever changed by
the decision in Caremark and its predecessors, it seems that, for now,
the Delaware courts are unwilling to further erode the protections of
the business judgment rule.
V. Legal and Regulatory Challenges of Climate-Change
This Article now examines how the Supreme Court, Congress, EPA,
and SEC all converge to impact how corporate boards should respond
to the impact of climate change.
A. Massachusetts v. EPA
In April 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued a remarka-
ble ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA.' In it, the Court professed an
unwillingness to keep climate change issues on the back burner.2 2 2
The saga began in 2006, when a concerned coalition of state and local
governments, together with environmental organizations, deeming
global warming "the most pressing environmental challenge of our
time, "2 petitioned EPA to designate vehicle emissions as greenhouse
gases and a threat to the health and welfare of the country, and
thereby regulate them under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act.22 4 EPA
sought and received a large amount of public comment on the subject
and eventually decided, for a number of reasons, not to take the re-
quested action.2 2 ' The coalition appealed to, and ultimately lost in,
the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. 2
The coalition then brought their appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court.22 ' The Court granted the coalition's writ of certiorari2 2" and
took the somewhat unusual step of articulating a telling reason for the
grant of the writ: the "unusual importance of the underlying issue."22
220. Id. at 131.
221. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
222. Id. at 527.
223. Id. at 505.
224. Id. at 510.
225. Id. at 511.
226. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 415 F.3d 50, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
227. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 548 U.S. 903 (2007).
228. Id.
229. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 506.
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In a detailed ruling, the Court reversed the decision of the Circuit
Court23 0 and, in so doing, broke new ground on a number of issues,
but the decision is not without significant criticism.
The opinion opened with a significant statement regarding the
overarching issues surrounding the controversy-issues that, to date,
remain a question in many individuals' minds. Justice Stevens directly
stated that "[a] well-documented rise in global temperatures has coin-
cided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon diox-
ide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are
related."2 1
First, the Court considered the issue of standing, that is, whether
the petitioners had the right to seek the relief they requested.2 3 2 Be
cause only one petitioner needed to show standing, of the numerous
states, cities, and organizations that composed the coalition, the Court
focused on the state of Massachusetts. 23 3 The Court found that Massa-
chusetts had standing based on its affidavits that it was suffering by way
of losing coastal land due to rising sea levels, believed to be attributa-
ble to climate change caused by GHG emissions. 234 justice Stevens,
for the Court, roundly rejected EPA's somewhat circular argument
that no particular individual had standing on climate change matters,
insofar as climate change, if it exists, would affect everyone.2 3 5
The Court did not buy EPA's argument that its refusal to regulate
GHG emissions -contributes so insignificantly to petitioners' injuries
that the agency cannot be haled into court to answer for them." 2 3 6 It
rejected what it saw as an erroneous assumption by EPA that "a small
incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a
230. Id. at 535.
231. Id. at 505.
232. Id. Standing in an environmental protection case, under Supreme Court's
Lujan test, requires a showing of "concrete and particularized, actual or
imminent invasion of a legally protected interest"; a showing that the injury
is fairly traceable to the defendant; and a showing that the relief sought will
redress that injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 556
(1992). The standing concept, among other things, discourages individu-
als with no real stake in the outcome of a case from using the courts to
redress perceived societal wrongs. One can easily imagine the hurdles in
showing standing in the environmental realm where, in very few cases, does
pollution or similar arguable wrongs affect any one individual in a particu-
larized, concrete way. The very nature of environmental issues that affect a
wide range of citizens over a vast geographic area would seem to be self-
defeating with respect to standing. Indeed, in a number of situations,
claims by environmental groups alleging injuries resulting from environ-
mental issues have been rejected on standing grounds. See, e.g., Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
233. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 518.
234. Id. at 521-22.
235. Id. at 517-18.
236. Id. at 523.
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federal judicial forum," finding that "accepting that premise would
doom most challenges to regulatory action."a
Thereafter, the Court needed to consider what to do about the cli-
mate change issues. Obviously, the Court, like EPA, was faced with
evidence from all sides about the impact of GHGs on the environ-
ment, and the credibility of climate change. The Supreme Court is
not in the business of, and had no desire to engage in, analyzing the
data and determining whether EPA should regulate GHGs. Rather, it
rightfully recognized that EPA was best suited to consider matters
within its delegated area of expertise. 3 What it did do, however, was
require EPA to perform its job in the manner the petitioners
sought.239
Thus, the Supreme Court required the EPA to either decide to reg-
ulate GHGs or decline to do so and, if so, articulate the reasons for
such refusal that do not constitute an abuse of discretion. 240 One
might very well argue that the decision of the Supreme Court in this
case, fundamentally based on such mundane concepts as standing and
statutory construction, was a thinly veiled attempt at environmental
activism.2 4 1 Indeed, the 54 split of the decision shook out along ar-
guably philosophical lines.24 2 While one might be quick to condemn
such an outcome, a fair analysis must also take into consideration the
initial determination by the EPA not to regulate GHGs, which may
seem equally political, so far as to constitute (as the Supreme Court
found) an abuse of the trust instilled within EPA to consider properly
environmental matters.
Whatever the cause, the effect is clear. The Supreme Court will not
permit EPA or any other agencies to ignore the evidence of climate
change. If they choose to pay it no mind, their actions will be counter-
237. Id.
238. Id. at 535-36.
239. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 536.
240. Id.
241. For a critical essay that "pulls no punches" in criticizing the perceived polit-
ical goal of this decision, see Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Incon-
venient Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. REv. 75 (2007). In any event, the
Court's holding here is important for both its far-reaching consequences
and historical context. Juliet Eilperin commented that: "Massachusetts v.
EPA may be seen as akin to the Roe v. Wade ruling on abortion, in which
the Supreme Court answered a question that U.S. politicians were unable
to resolve. In this case, the justices stepped in to referee a scientific debate
that had become so highly polarized that individual states decided to sue
the federal government for what they saw as its failure to protect them from
a possible future catastrophe." Juliet Eilperin, The Court's Green Light for
Green Tech, WASH. PosT., April 8, 2007, at B3, available at http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/06/AR2007040601790.
html.
242. Stevens' opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Souter, and
Breyer. The remaining justices dissented at least in part. Massachusetts v.
E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 503.
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manded. While the Supreme Court is not yet in the business of sec-
ond-guessing the EPA on environmental issues, it will not stand idly by
while EPA exercises such unquestionably poor judgment that com-
pletely ignores the reality of the climate-change situation.
In many ways, the timing of the Supreme Court's decision could not
have been better. As discussed below, EPA did revisit the "green-
house-gas-as-pollutant under the Clean Air Act" issue, within a differ-
ent administration and in the context of a very different environment.
The results, and the ensuing regulatory and legislative environment,
were markedly different.
B. The EPA's Finding on GHG
Shortly after President Barak Obama's inauguration, which in-
cluded a climate change leadership pledge,24 federal regulators were
quick to respond. The EPA made sweeping, previously-unaddressed
observations in an April 2009 report.4 Specifically, the EPA issued
findings that emissions of greenhouse gases pose a danger to health
and welfare. 4 In the report, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson found
that "greenhouse gases [in the atmosphere] endanger the public
health and welfare of current and future generations. "2" The Admin-
istrator was straightforward on the cause of this tragedy, stating that
the "high atmospheric levels" of greenhouse gas concentrations "are
the unambiguous result of human emissions, and are very likely the
cause of the observed increase in average temperatures and other cli-
mactic changes."24 7 Nor did she soft-pedal the potential ramifications
of inaction including: more frequent and intense heat waves; wildfires;
degraded air quality; increased drought; and harm to wildlife, agricul-
ture, water resources, and ecosystems.2 48 Finally, she proposed to find
that emissions from new motor vehicles contributed to the green-
house gases that caused climate change. 24 9 These are not the sensitive
or self-serving observations of an environmental group, but the find-
ings of the nation's top environmental administrator25 0 and her obser-
vations carry great force. Specifically, if her findings were adopted,
then EPA would be empowered, under Section 202 of the Clean Air
243. Obama Climate Change Pledge, PRI, Nov. 24, 2008, http://www.pri.org/sci-
ence/environment/obama-climate-change-pledge.html.
244. Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Green-
house Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 78,
18886 (proposed Apr. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 18898.
247. Id. at 18886.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Administrator Lisa jackson, EPA.GOv, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/admin-
istrator.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
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Act, to prescribe regulations regarding these emissions from new mo-
tor vehicles.
At the time, it would have been shortsighted to believe that the con-
cerns over climate change would stop with motor vehicles. Climate
change had become one of the top issues on many voters' agendas,2 12
and citizens would likely not stand idly by while the status quo was
maintained. Voters expected sweeping changes from their new Presi-
dent and his Democratic majority in Congress.
C. American Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009
Voters did not have to wait long; just a few months after President
Obama's inauguration, on May 15, 2009, Representative Henry Wax-
man of California introduced his own climate change measure, House
Resolution 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
("ACE"), the stated purpose of which was: "l[t]o create clean energy
jobs, achieve energy independence, reduce global warming pollution,
and transition to a clean energy economy. "253 ACE passed in the
House of Representatives on June 26, 2009.5 It is currently pending
in the U. S. Senate.255
ACE has already won support in the boardroom. Prominent mem-
ber corporations of the Chamber of Commerce resigned their mem-
bership in response to the Chamber's hostile stance on climate
legislation:
... Apple, Mohawk Paper and the utilities Pacific Gas and
Electric, Exelon and PNM Resources - cited the chamber's
climate policy as counterproductive. All said that some form
of greenhouse gas regulation or legislation was coming and
251. For a discussion of the likely high costs of compliance with these regula-
tions, see Jonathan Weisman & Siobhan Hughes, U.S. in Historic Shift on
C02: Businesses Brace for Costly New Rules as EPA Declares Warming Gases a
Threat, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB123997738881429275.html.
252. Scott Horsley, 2008 Election Issues: Climate Change, NPR.ORG, http://
www.npr.org/news/specials/election2008/issues/climate.html (last visited
Apr. 6, 2011).
253. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong., § 1 (2009).
254. H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, GovTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 111-2454 (last visited Feb.
11, 2011).
255. Sadly, ACE and all other pending climate change legislation have been
"shelved" as of July 2010, by Senate Democratic leaders for political rea-
sons, resulting in a major setback to President Obama's ambitious energy
plan. See Stephen Power, Senate Halts Effort to Cap C02 Emissions, WALL ST.
J., July 23, 2010, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014
24052748703467304575383373600358634.html.
251
252 University of Baltimore Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 18
that they did not want to pay dues to an organization that
appeared to be standing in its way.2 5 6
Should ACE be enacted into law, the effect it will have on U.S. busi-
nesses will be profound. Its provisions are wide-ranging and well be-
yond the scope of this article, but a review of key points is in order.
ACE requires major utilities to derive increasing percentages of their
electricity supply from renewable sources;2 5 7 requires federal agencies
to obtain their power from renewable sources; 258 changes energy effi-
ciency standards on a wide range of matters, from lamps and other
consumer appliances, to buildings; 2 5 9 and requires new emission stan-
dards for automobiles.2 6 0
Moreover, most applicable to the business community is Title III."'
The very title could not be clearer: "Reducing Global Warming Pollu-
tion."2 6 2 A review of the critical provisions within this Title leaves no
doubt that the concept of man's impact on the environment in caus-
ing global warming has been settled, at least in the mind of Congress-
men Waxman and, as of this date, a majority of the House of
Representatives.263
This Title imposes significant requirements on EPA regarding the
reduction of global warming pollution, the effects of which will be
widely felt in the business community. First, the issue of GHGs as a
major cause of climate change has been foreclosed: ACE proposes to
amend the Clean Air Act to require EPA to "promulgate regulations
to cap and reduce [GHG] emissions" over the next forty years, culmi-
nating in a 17% reduction.2 6 4 Strikingly, ACE discusses the impact of
deforestation on GHGs, requires EPA to report regularly to Congress
on developments in climate change science, and reclassifies certain
gases as GHGs.16 ' From a business reporting standpoint, ACE re-
quires certain reporting entities that exceed threshold GHG emission
levels to report on their business. 2 6 6
256. John M. Broder, Storm Over the Chamber, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at Fl, F7,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/business/energy-envi-
ronment/ 19CHAMBER.html.
257. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 § 101 (d) (2).
258. Id. at § 103(a).
259. Id. at §§ 206, 211, 212 (2009).
260. Id. at § 221.
261. Id. at § 301.
262. Id.
263. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 § 311.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. John M. Broder, U.S. Issues Limits on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Cars, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/
02/science/earth/02emit.html.
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D. EPA's GHG Rule and Reporting Requirement
In April 2010, the EPA stepped into the legislative void and political
fray left by the Senate's hijacking of ACE.2" The agency, taking its
first official step down the road to regulate GHGs, issued final rules
for GHG emissions for automobiles and light trucks, ending a thirty-
year fight between regulators and automakers.2 " However, this GHG
reporting program also sets the stage for potentially a bigger battle
over GHG emissions from stationary sources like steel mills, power
plants, and refineries.2" The rules are anticipated to reduce GHG
emissions by about 30% from 2012 to 2016, and save the average
owner of a 2016 automobile about $3,000 in fuel over the life-expec-
tancy of the vehicle. 7
Now that the EPA has likewise finalized and effectuated its GHG
endangerment findings,271 its effects in the corporate boardroom are
unclear. Notably, these new EPA rules have already generated a re-
cord number of lawsuits against the EPA on behalf of nearly one hun-
dred parties, including fifteen states and fifteen members of
Congress. 7 While none of these suits have been successful, the au-
thors of this Article anticipate that the Supreme Court would uphold
these and future GHG rules, consistent with its landmark GHG ruling
in 2007. As a result, the GHG emission mitigation tide appears to
have made a defining turn, and a return to the days of un-regulation is
unlikely. Through Congressional default, the EPA is now poised to set
federal limits on GHG gases using its powers under the Clean Air Act.
Boards will have to formulate strategy and risk reduction in this
regard.
E. The SEC's Surprise Disclosure Guidance
The SEC, because of its power to enforce securities laws and SOX,
and to mandate disclosure of relevant information, is the entity most
suited to regulate corporate responsibility in the area of climate-
change disclosure.
In a surprise controversial and historic move, in February 2010, the
SEC entered the climate-change fray.27' The SEC published its inter-
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Green-
house Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, supra note 244.
This action was a prerequisite to finalizing the EPA's GHG emission stan-
dards for light-duty vehicles. Id.
272. Jenna Greene, Air Assault: 38 Lawsuits Filed Over New Greenhouse Gas Rules,
NAT'L. L. J., June 14, 2010, at 1, 10.
273. Press Release, SEC Issues Interpretive Guidance on Disclosure Related to
Business or Legal Developments Regarding Climate Change (Jan. 27,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-15.htm.
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pretive release to provide guidance to public companies regarding the
agency's existing disclosure requirements as they apply to climate
change matters. 27 4 This guidance came on the heels of the SEC re-
ceiving petitions from investors who "had close to $1.4 trillion under
management. While being careful to avoid giving an explicit opin-
ion on the issue of climate change itself, the SEC did indicate that
companies could be helped or hurt by GHG-related litigation, busi-
ness opportunities, or legislation, and should promptly disclose such
potential impacts to investors.2 7 ' For example, banks or insurance
companies that invest in littoral property that could be affected by
storms or rising seas should disclose such business risks. As discussed
below, this SEC guidance should be helpful to companies in deter-
mining how to disclose material climate-change risk and reward to
investors.
F Securities & Corporate Law and Climate Change
The corporate citizen may not sit back and relax unless and until
ACE or another environmental bill is enacted into law or the EPA or
SEC promulgates a new rule. Companies may find that existing laws
provide novel ways of ensuring their compliance with sound environ-
mental policy.
First, we may see the impact by the new application of old require-
ments. Corporate responsibility in the form of mandatory reporting
of key material issues is nothing new. In the shadow of the Great De-
pression, the federal government took steps to ensure that corpora-
tions disclosed to potential investors all "material information"
necessary to make an informed choice about an investment. Notably,
these laws-the Securities Act of 1933277 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934"2 -do not specify precisely what actual, substantive cate-
gories of information might be "material.""' Rather, it appears up to
274. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change,
75 Fed. Reg. 25 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified as 17 C.F.R. 211, 231, 241).
275. Kara Scannell, SEC Discord Could Stymie Schapiro's Efforts, W u ST. J., Feb. 6,
2010, at B, available at http://compliancesearch.com/compliancex/news-
and-current-events/sec-discord-could-stymie-schapiros-efforts/.
276. John Broder, S.E.C. Adds Risk Related to Climate to Disclosure List, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2010, at B1, B7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/
business/28sec/html?scp= 1&sq=s.e.c.+adds+climate+risk&st=nyt.
277. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (Westlaw 2010).
278. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (Westlaw 2010).
279. A full discussion of the concept of "materiality" in securities regulation is
beyond the scope of this Article, but suffice it to say that certain environ-
mental liabilities can and do rise to the level of materiality requiring disclo-
sure. Sce Christina Ross et al., Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the
Context of Global Climate Change, 26 STAN. EN\rL. L.J. 251, 267 (2007) ("Over
ninety percent of the largest publicly traded utilities have addressed climate
change in recent filings."). This is compounded by SOX's more stringent
disclosure requirements that arguably will cause companies to err on the
side of more disclosure. See David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling
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the companies to determine, for themselves, what a reasonable inves-
tor might deem important in determining whether to invest in a given
company.
1. Regulation S-K
Regulation S-K prescribes instructions for companies' SEC filings
and mandates certain disclosures.2 11o Certain Items in Regulation S-K
have a profound impact on companies' disclosure duties with respect
to climate change.
a. Item 101
Under Regulation S-K, Item 101, companies must disclose the "ef-
fect of existing or probable governmental regulations" upon their op-
erations, working capital, earnings, and competitive position.21' Of
course, a discussion of the effect of compliance with existing laws-
likely a framework within which the given company has operated for
years and years-is routine for most organizations. But, more and
more, those responsible for compliance with this once-rote require-
ment may find their jobs more difficult, especially in light of the new
federal regulations analyzed above and the new ones that are likely to
be placed into the regulatory pipeline. Boards will need to be vigilant.
b. Item 103
Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires issuers to disclose pending
legal matters that are "material."2 8 2 Interestingly, this would include
proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental author-
ities.283
Given the current regulatory and litigative environment, the wise
corporate guardian would be remiss in not considering that any flout-
ing of environmental law might be short-lived and result in costly liti-
gation. Moreover, given the expansive reading of the standing
concept as set forth in Massachusetts v. EPA, discussed above,28 4 organi-
zations must be sensitive to the fact that the federal courts of the U.S.
might now provide a previously unavailable forum for the redress of
large-scale environmental wrongs perpetrated by an entity (or an in-
Through Counterfactual Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search
for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN ENVTL. L.J.
137, 144 (2007) ("an expansive view of [SOX] suggests that a heightened
level of diligence is now required when determining whether there is a duty
to disclose information that is conceivably material, financial or otherwise.")
(emphasis added).
280. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10-229.802 (Westlaw 2010).
281. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(h) (4) (ix) (Westlaw 2010).
282. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (Westlaw 2010)
283. Id.
284. See discussion supra Part VII.A.
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dustry) over a wide geographic range, by an affected citizen (or even
potentially more damaging, a large group of affected citizens)."2
The enactment of ACE would certainly not serve to assuage con-
cerns over environmental litigation, and the impact thereof must be
considered by the prudent corporate steward. In an early draft of
ACE, Section 336 allowed "any person who has suffered, or reasonably
expects to suffer, a harm attributable, in whole or in part," to climate
change, to bring a lawsuit for damages against the offending entity. 6
Such citizens can recover money damages per violation,"8 and the
concept of a violation is even more noteworthy. A violation is "any
effect" that is "currently occurring or at risk of occurring," and would
even include any "incremental exacerbation" of a citizen's injury asso-
ciated with a "small incremental emission. "288
Thus, the traditional hurdle of causation-wherein an individual,
plagued by similar harms emanating from a variety of sources, cannot
identify the precise source that caused him the precise harm-has
been turned on its head, and allows recovery against any organization
arguably participating in the wrongful conduct.
Hence, an organization may not take comfort in the fact that it is a
small fish in a large pond, operating only in the shadows of another,
larger, or more culpable organization. The smaller organization may
very well be the more suitable target of suit, and therefore, might bear
an inordinate amount of responsibility for a harm to which it has only
minimally contributed. Because such an organization can no longer
stand idly by, it would seem that the best-reasoned view is to take any
action necessary to ensure that one contribute not even a "small incre-
mental emission" that might exacerbate climate change issues. To do
so requires smart, focused, and expert leadership at the level of top
management and board of directors.
285. SeeJohn Schwartz, Courts Emerging as Battlefield for Fights Over Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
01/27/business/energy-env-ironment/27awsuits.html. Major climate-
change litigation is currently in play in three federal circuit courts of ap-
peal. Id. These lawsuits have been filed by environmental groups, private
lawyers, and state officials against large producers of GHG. Id. With re-
spect to these cases, a professor at the University of Houston Law Center
predicts that "the game pieces are being set for eventual Supreme Court
review." Id.
286. Staff of H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong., Discussion Draft
American Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009 § 336(a), at 527-28 (Mar. 31,
2009). This particular section was abandoned in later versions of the bill.
See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 § 336 (as introduced
in House, May 15, 2009) (omitting language quoted above).
287. Staff of H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong., Discussion Draft
American Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009 § 336(a), at 527-28 (Mar. 31,
2009).
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c. Item 303
Item 303 of Regulation S-K' requires an even more subjective
analysis of facts and circumstances. Specifically, Item 303 requires is-
suers to disclose information regarding the organization's "financial
condition, changes in financial condition and results of operation" in
the section entitled Management's Discussion and Analysis
("MD&A") .29o Included therewith is the requirement that the issuer
disclose "known trends, events or uncertainties that are reasonably
likely to have material effects" on the company's financial
condition."'
It is not at all clear whether climate change issues need to be dis-
closed under Item 303. First, a corporation must disclose only infor-
mation that is available "without undue effort or expense," and need
not (but, indeed, may) attempt to anticipate future trends or events
and the impact thereof on the business-so-called "forward-looking
information.""9 A company need disclose only circumstances that
are reasonably likely to occur, and only if those circumstances are rea-
sonably likely to have an impact on future business-that is, the SEC
adopts a predictability and materiality standard in determining
whether a matter must be disclosed.2 93
The SEC considers information to be material if there is a "substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important"
in deciding whether to invest.2 9 4
Information about a company's climate-change policy might be of
crucial importance to a particular class of investors. Thus, the failure
to disclose as "immaterial" a company's irresponsible environmental
policy, even if currently legal, may not be as "unimportant" or "imma-
terial" as the company might have thought.
2. Potential Liability
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and regulations embodied in Rule
10b-5 2 11 therein, make it unlawful to make untrue statements or to fail
289. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (Westlaw 2010).
290. Id.
291. Id. at (a) (1).
292. Id.
293. Id. at (a) (3) (ii).
294. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
295. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. This rule broadly describes those actions to which
liability may attach: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To em-
ploy any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances which
they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
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to include necessary information.2 9 ' Given the foregoing, if it is
deemed that climate change matters are material, and if the organiza-
tion has failed to disclose them, there could be devastating criminal or
civil penalties for the company and its officers and directors.
Rule lOb-5 could also embody a private right of action, whereby an
injured plaintiff may bring a lawsuit, including a class action lawsuit,
for violations thereof.29 7 Potential plaintiffs need not be confined to
those wishing to make a political statement by bringing suit on climate
change issues. If a company's stock price drops precipitously because
of the logical consequence of a climate change matter which was ig-
nored and not disclosed, then any investor in the company's stock is a
potential plaintiff.298
G. Science and Fiduciary Duty
The Delaware General Corporation Law envisions that directors will
justifiably rely not only on officers and employees of their companies,
but also on others whose "professional or expert competence" lies
within the referenced area, and which the corporation has selected
"with reasonable care."2 99
This raises interesting implications in the context of climate-change
science. Climate-change science and climatology in general, present
issues likely beyond the ordinary director's knowledge. Even so, it
similarly seems unlikely that a reasonable director could plausibly as-
sert that, in connection with the exercise of his directorial duties for a
company in the cross-hairs of the climate-change movement, he or she
was unaware of climate change issues. Accordingly, some inquiry with
the experts must be initiated.
As discussed in this Article, there is no dearth of scientific informa-
tion regarding climate change. One may find competent, seemingly
upon any person in conmection with the purchase or sale of any security."
Id.
296. Id.
297. Edward X. Clinton,Jr., The Private Right ofAction Under Section 10(b) and Rule
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298. See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). That is, a plaintiff need not
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the disclosure (or lack thereof) of a climate-change matter. See id. at 243.
The "fraud on the market" theory, premised upon the Efficient Market Hy-
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out a showing that they personally relied on information disclosed. See id.
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well-reasoned scientific opinion, falling on both sides of the GHG cli-
mate-change link. What, then, must a board member do? Is it suffi-
cient to seek opinions from only those experts who support that
director's individual beliefs regarding GHGs and climate change? Or
must he or she consider and weigh both sides of the argument?so
Once again, echoes of Massachusetts v. EPA resonate, where, the Su-
preme Court second-guessed findings of an administrative agency that
it did not consider plausible or relevant.so' The decisions of federal
administrative agencies are given great deference by the courts,o 2
much like the discretion and protections afforded directors by the
business judgment rule.sos Does the willingness of the Supreme Court
to second guess an agency's decision, and the plausibility of the foun-
dations for that decision, portend closer scrutiny of the basis for a
director's decision? It seems this is increasingly likely. Can a massive
polluter surround itself only with scientific opinions that climate
change is a "hoax" in defense of its inaction or non-disclosure? The
safe answer is "no."
VI. Climate-Change as a National and Global Security Threat
As we soberly lifted the specter earlier in this Article, climate
change's collision with national and global security could someday
catch the eye of state or federal court judges. This Article addresses
that proposition. National security agencies commonly accept the
proposition that global warming could exacerbate national threats
such as disease, drought, famine, and mass migrationo.30  This could
ultimately result in regional conflicts and the need for America's
armed forces to engage in peacekeeping, defense, and humanitarian
efforts both at home and abroad.sos
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For the first time, the Pentagon and the intelligence community are
taking a serious look at the national security implications of climate
change.3 "* There is growing concern that these types of climate-in-
duced crises could topple governments and feed terrorist move-
ments." So concerned is the CIA about the national security impact
of climate change, it now runs a program that employs spy satellites
that assess the hidden complexities of environmental change for the
research benefit of about sixty scientists.3 0  Truly, global warming is
making for some very strange bedfellows. These spy satellites are even
tracking "particular ice floes as they drift through the Arctic basin
rather than just monitoring static sites." 09
One legal commentator cogently submits that both the U.S. and
other developing nations have a legal and moral obligation to change
their consumption behavior in order to alleviate the security and
welfare threat to other nations from these "unsustainable patterns of
consumption."s' Does that legal duty fall to not only the U.S. govern-
ment, but also to corporate America? While it is beyond the scope of
this Article to delve deeply into this important query, the authors en-
courage further research in this arena because, in the foreseeable fu-
ture, a court may take judicial notice that climate change is an
observable fact supported by science and the laws of nature," mak-
ing it ripe for such a judicial declaration. That would be the first step
down the slippery slope of judicial notice of the security havoc that
climate change can induce globally, opening the door wider to some
306. John M. Broder, Climate Change Seen as Threat to U.S. Security, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/sci-
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PosT, June 17, 2009, at A3.
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frivolous and perhaps some meritorious lawsuits against corporations
and boards.
In a general context, we do note that, using the "rubric of sustaina-
ble development, the [Supreme] Court [of India] took judicial notice
of the precautionary principle and the polluter-pays principle as prin-
ciples of customary international law" in litigation brought by an NGO
".against the government of India to protect public health from the
leather and tannery industries." 1 2 Most notably, an NGO initiated
this litigation."' In the future, the litigation equation will likely target
an American publicly-held company. The gravamen of that suit will
have some echoes of how excessive GHG emissions from that com-
pany spawned a new terrorist movement or brought drought in a de-
veloping nation. The risk management lesson here is that the climate-
change director and the audit committee need to team up and raise
their collective consciousness about how climate change's impact on
national and global security could make their companies more vulner-
able in unforeseeable ways.
VII. Conclusion
This Article has sought to illuminate the need for a climate-change
related restructuring in the corporate America's boardrooms in the
midst of a continuing financial crisis; aggressive government interven-
tion in the affairs of corporations; confusion and skepticism in rapidly
changing GHG policy, regulation, and law; and rising global tempera-
tures that have triggered urgent concerns from the national security
and intelligence communities. A climate-change director who can
give strategic clarity to this picture and collegially change the climate
in the boardroom is an affirmative manifestation to all stakeholders,
including shareholders and the government, that the board is com-
mitted to prudent climate-change risk management and disclosure in
this new carbon-constrained world. By adding a climate-change ex-
pert to the board of directors, corporations and individual directors
may be able to insulate themselves from potential liabilities, guide the
company in a responsible direction, and even deliver extra value to
shareholders.
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